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ABSTRACT
R ecent D evelopm ents in
Federal-State Relations:
S elected Cases in
Federalism
by
Michael Jam es Stamcoff
Dr. J e n y Simich, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
An interesting moment in Supreme Court history was the rise of
William Rehnquist to Chief Justice in 1986. Under Rehnquist, the Court
for the first time in nearly sixty years issued decisions th a t limited
federal power. However, were the decisions indicative of the destruction
of cooperative federalism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 or
merely exercises limiting the excesses of federal power? This paper
argues the latter. Recently, the Court further cemented their belief in
cooperative federalism, while limiting its excesses where necessary in the
cases of Nevada Department o f Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003),
Granholm v. Heald (2005), Gonzales v. Raich (2005), Kelo v. City o f New
London (2005), and Gonzales v. Oregon (2006). The Granholm, Raich and
Kelo decisions were clear cooperative federalism victories; while Hibbs
retreated from more stringent Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment

111

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

jurisprudence and Oregon recognized the limitations of the federal
government in the realm of police powers.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
In April 1995, the Suprem e Court issued its opinion in Lopez v. United
States. For the first time in nearly sixty years, the Court placed a
limitation to the exercise of federal power when utilizing the Commerce
Clause. Critics lauded th a t it was a clear step towards “dism antling the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937. Lopez emboldened federal courts to
breathe new life into clauses such as ‘privileges and im m unities’ and
doctrines such as improper delegation th a t had been m oribund since the
age of Roosevelt” (Leuchtenburg 2002, 97). Other critics w ent so far to
declare “it appears th a t Rehnquist and his conservative colleagues don’t
ju s t want to tu rn the clock back to the days before Earl Warren; they’re
hankering, it seems, for the Articles of Confederation” (Toobin 1995, 82).
Were these predictions accurate? It is that question th a t will be
explored herein. It is now eleven years later and the Court h as had
ample time to display w hether or not Lopez truly m arked the beginning of
a federalism revolution or simply an indication th at the Court would no
longer allow the federal government free reign.
Through the analysis of key post-Lopez Supreme Court cases th at
many proponents of the federalism revolution theory believe are
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indicative of a radical shift, this paper will dem onstrate th a t the
Rehnquist C ourt’s federalism jurisprudence is not indicative of a
federalism revolution, b u t rather a judicial check on the excesses of
federal power while still maintaining the core of cooperative federalism as
most fully explained in United States v. Darby Lumber (1941) and
Wickard v. Filbum (1942). This shall be accomplished looking solely
through the lens of the Court.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 traces the history of
federalism from the beginning of the republic to the ascension of William
Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice in 1986. Highlighted are the
major cases th a t define the Court’s federalism interpretations. The next
chapter details the life of Rehnquist and several decisions made during
his tenure on the Court beginning in 1971. Furtherm ore, it examines
the num erous cases of the 1990s and early 2000s th a t limited the
exercise of federal power and whether or not the decisions radically
altered the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
detail five recent cases {Nevada Department o f Human R esourœ s v.
Hibbs, Granholm v. Heald, Gonzales v. Raich, Kelo v. City o f New London,
and Gonzales v. Oregon) th a t address this same issue of federalism
jurisprudence. Lastly, Chapter 9 explains the current state of federalism
as of the sum m er of 2006, exploring the jurisprudence of the justices, as
well as whether or not the Court’s collective opinions since Lopez truly
m ark a dismantling of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 and
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cooperative federalism.
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CHAPTER 2

A HISTORY OF FEDERALISM
In September 1786, a M assachusetts farmer and Revolutionaiy War
veteran nam ed Daniel Shays led a small group of armed m en to a
Springfield courthouse with the intent of stopping land foreclosures. The
end of the Revolutionary War resulted in an economic “depression [that]
left many small farmers unable to pay their debts” (Edwards et al. 2005,
34) and th u s the farmers were intent on m aintaining w hat little they had
left. The uprising shocked the elites who “were scared at the thought
th at people had taken the law into their own hands and violated the
property rights of others. Neither Congress nor the state able to raise a
militia to stop Shays and his followers and a privately paid force was
assembled to do the job” (Edwards et al. 2005, 34). The government
created under the Articles of Confederation was troublesome and this
armed uprising served to solidify it. “Simply put, the Fram ers and the
Founders recognized th a t the states were not the solution, and th a t state
sovereignty was not the unalloyed blessing m uch of the current rhetoric
ascribed to it. The states were, rath er the primary source of the
problems th at plagued the Confederation” (Killenbeck 2002, 27). After
an aborted attem pt to deal with the problems inherent in the Article of
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Confederation in Annapolis, Maryland th a t same m onth (representatives
from only five states bothered to show up), it was attem pted again in May
1787. This time the convention would be held in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and would change history.
The Constitutional Convention was attended by 12 states (Rhode
Island did not find it significant enough) with a total of 55
representatives. The Convention decided rather than simply amending
the Articles of Confederation, they would instead draft a new framework
for government. Through constant debates, the Convention decided on
such m atters as a strong bicameral legislature, a weak executive, and an
ambiguous judiciary. It is here, in the debates of w hat the government
should look like, th at the issue of federalism first arose. “Federalism is a
way organizing a nation so th at two levels of government have formal
authority over the same land and people” (Edwards et al. 2005, 615).
Indeed, many of the convention’s delegates felt the majority of power
should be vested in the states. These individuals were the AntiFederalists and included such leaders as George Clinton, Jam es
Winthrop and Robert Yates. Another group favored a strong central
government and as such was referred to as Federalists. The Federalist
ranks included Jam es Madison, Jo h n Jay and Alexander Hamilton.
Both the Federalists and Anti-Federalist published a series of articles
defending their positions on various governmental issues. In Federalist
No. 28, Alexander Hamilton wrote
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Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations
of the state governments, and these will have the sam e disposition
towards the general government. The people, by throwing
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If
their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other
as the instrum ent of redress (Publius 2003, 176-177).
Furtherm ore, in Federalist No. 39, Jam es Madison solidified the notion of
federalism writing “the proposed Constitution, therefore, even when
tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is in, strictness, neither
a national nor a federal Constitution, b u t a composition of both” (Publius
2003, 242). Federalism was bom.
The federalism debate of the 1780s dem onstrated w hat was and still
is so complicated about the subject. Its two central questions are “How
was federalism possible in theory? and How would it work in practice”
(Rakove 1996, 188)? The fear of Anti-Federalists rested on the notion of
imperium in imperio th a t stated “two sovereign authorities could not
coexist in one polity; one or the other had to be supreme; and because
power itself was dynamic, the loser in the competition m u st expect its
authority to continue to atrophy” (Rakove 1996, 182). Thus, the issue of
federalism will always be problematic since there is a constant struggle
between the nation and states. The issue becomes even more
problematic since there is not a concrete way to determine how
federalism would exist in practice. Only time would tell. Taken together,
these factors indicated th at federalism was an issue th a t would
consistently trouble the nation.
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The Federalists were largely successful in achieving their aim s.
However, the Anti-Federalists insisted on a series of am endm ents
protecting individual rights and liberties. These were tacked onto the
Constitution as opposed to incorporated since the Constitution is simply
a blueprint for how the government should be structured. Among the
ten amendments, soon to be cedled the Bill of Rights, was the Tenth
Amendment.
Amendment X: The pow ers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States, respectively, or to the people.
Indeed, “by dividing political authority and sovereignty between the
national government and the states, federalism provides a structural
check on national power, protecting not only states' rights b u t individual
rights” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 53). Thus, the idea of federalism was
firmly planted into American government. However, how would the
newly established Supreme Court of the United States interpret this
idea?

The M arshall Court (1801-1835)
McCullochv. Maryland (1819)
No case captures the essence of the Marshall Court’s interpretation of
federalism than McCulloch v. Maryland. During the Constitutional
Convention, the idea of a National B ank arose; however, it was not given
m uch discussion. During George W ashington’s first-term as president.
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Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton was “asked to prepare a
report on creating a national bank” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 55) by the
House of Representatives. It narrowly passed Congressional approval
and Washington signed the b an k bill into law in 1791.
The Bank w as rechartered in 1816. It was the so-called Era of Good
Feelings in the United States, however, th at would quickly change. “Late
in 1818 the Second Bank of the United States ordered state banks to
demand repaym ent of all loans. It also required state ban k s to exchange
their notes for gold and silver. Few banks could do this. The result was
the Panic of 1819...[and] the nation quickly sank into an economic
depression th a t lasted several years” (Boyer 2003, 237). Furtherm ore,
“because of inefficiency and corruption, the bank was very unpopular,
and many blamed it for the nation’s problems” (Epstein and Walker
2004, 327). Thus, in 1818, the state of Maryland passed a law “taxing
the national b an k ’s Baltimore branch $15,000 a yeair. The Baltimore
branch refused to pay, whereupon the state of Maryland sued the
cashier, Jam es McCulloch, for paym ent” (Edwards et al. 2005, 74). After
the Maryland state courts upheld their legislature’s decision, it was
appealed to M arshall’s court.
In the landm ark decision, Marshall “embraced an expansive view of
Congress’ powers” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 56). The three areas of
constitutional law it addressed were the Tenth Amendment, the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause.

8
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As it pertains to the Tenth Amendment, Marshall, writing the C ourt’s
opinion, stated
Even the 10^ Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of
quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the
word “expressly,” and declares only th at the power “not delegated
to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to
the states or to the people,” th u s leaving the question, w hether
particular power which may become the subject of contest has
been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other,
to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrum ent (17 U.S.
316).
Thus, since the Constitution did not specifically mention the bank, it
does not necessarily exclude Congress from creating it. This is because
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Necessary and Proper Clause is found in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution and states Congress possesses the power “to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
forgoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any D epartm ent of Office thereof”
(Berman and Murphy, 2000). According to M arshall’s opinion (a 6-0
opinion)
Among the enum erated powers, we do not find th at of establishing
a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the
instrum ent which, like the articles of confederation, excludes
incident or implied powers; and which requires th at everything
granted shall be expressly and minutely described (17 U.S. 316).
Thus, Congress does have the constitutional right to establish a bank
despite no direct mention. This proved to be an extremely wide
interpretation of implied powers and in fact “this was indeed the broadest
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possible definition of national power...This ruling created the potential
for the national government to expand its powers into m any areas th a t
had previously been thought to be reserved to the states (Berman and
Murphy 2000, 106). However, regarding the issue of states taxing a
federal bank, what was its legality?
The state of Maryland’s tax on the Baltimore office of the Second Bank
of the United States was also struck down in McCulloch on the basis th a t
it violated the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause is found in
Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution stating
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
Supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state
to the contrary notw ithstanding (Berman and Murphy, 2000).
As such Marshall wrote “th a t the states have no power, by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any m anner control the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the general government” (17 U.S. 316). In
fact, some quip th at the opinion “contains language expansive enough
th a t it would, if taken literally, prevent states from requiring U.S. mail
trucks to stop at red lights” (Nagel 2001, 75). This wide interpretation of
federal power would be indicative of the Marshall Court’s federalism
jurisprudence and expanded to the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v.
Ogden (1824).

10
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Gibbons V. Ogden (1824)
The earliest commerce clause interpretation would occur in
Gibbons. The Commerce Clause is found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
and states Congress has the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”
(Berman and Murphy, 2000). Gibbons
Involved a license to operate steam boats in the w aters between
New York and New Jersey. One man, Aaron Ogden, had
purchased a state-issued license to do so in New York waters,
while his former partner, Thomas Gibbons, had gone to the
national government for a federal coasting license. It was left to
the Supreme Court to decide whether the central government’s
power of interstate commerce predominated over an individual
state’s power to regulate intrastate commerce (Berman and Murphy
2000, 107).
In a 6-0 decision, the Court again took an expansive view of federal
power in different ways. Marshall wrote the opinion stating firstly
defining commerce. “Commerce, undoubtedly is traffic, b u t it is
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on th at intercourse” (22
U.S. 1). He then addressed the issue of intrastate commerce, “it is not
intended to say th a t these words comprehend th at commerce, which is
completely internal, which is carried on between m an and m an in a
State, or between the different parts of the same State, and which does
not extend or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient

11
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and is certainly unnecessary” (22 U.S. 1). Thus, it is not Congress’ place
to regulate commerce when th at commerce is completely within a single
state’s boundary. Thirdly, the Court ruled, “commerce among the States
m ust, of necessity, be commerce with States” (22 U.S. 1). This m eans
that “commerce among the states begins in one state and ends in
another; it does not stop when the act of crossing a state border is
completed. Consequently, commerce th a t occurs within a state may be
part of a larger interstate process” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 412).
Lastly, the court dealt with the issue of regulation. Marshall wrote, “this
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utm ost extent and acknowledges no limitations, other
than prescribed in the Constitution” (22 U.S. 1). Thus, once an activity
was deemed to be commerce. Congress possesses the power to regulate
it.
In all, the decision took a very expansive definition of commerce th a t
would dominate the Court’s jurisprudence, b u t it went one step further,
reinforcing its strong view of national supremacy as evidenced in
McCulloch. “In every such case, the act of Congress...is supreme; and
the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, m u st yield to it” (22 U.S. 1). Again, the Court applied the
relevance of the Supremacy Clause as the Fram ers intended. The
decision was called “the ultim ate in nationalism ” (Mendelson 1960, 22).

12
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This sweeping conviction of national supremacy as evidenced in the
McCulloch and Gibbons decisions signified the Marshall C ourt’s idea of
federalism. In M arshall’s interpretation, the state possesses power,
however, national sovereignty reigns supreme. It is the earliest concept
in the history of the United States of how federalism should exist,
however, over time this concept would be altered.

The Taney Court (1836-1864)
John M arshall’s death in 1835 m arked a radical turning point of the
Court and its interpretation of federalism. The successor to the position
of Chief Justice would be Roger Taney, an appointee and political crony
of Andrew Jackson. In 1831, Jackson nominated Taney to be the U.S.
Attorney General. In this position, “Taney played a leading role in the
controversy over the Second Bank of the United Sates, helping to write
President Jack so n ’s message in 1832 vetoing the b an k ’s recharter”
(Epstein and Walker 2004, 333). Obviously, this position was in direct
opposition to the Marshall Court and the McCulloch decision. He later
became Jackson’s Secretary of the Treasury after the existing secretary,
William Duane, “refused to withdraw federal deposits from the national
bank (Epstein and Walker 2004, 333). However, Taney was never
confirmed by the Senate, and after a long delay, when Jackson finally
tendered the nomination, it was hastily rejected. Believing so strongly in
the Spoils System he championed, Jackson nominated Taney for the

13
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Court in 1835, b u t again, the Senate postponed the nomination.
Jackson re-nom inated Taney later th a t year and was confirmed as
Marshall’s replacem ent as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on March
15, 1836. It would end up an ironic choice since Jackson did everything
in his power to quell the Nullification Crisis of 1832-1833 an d insisted on
union, yet would appoint a m an whose constitutional interpretation
would lead to the m ost cataclysmic war in United States history th at
shattered the Union.
The Taney Court’s interpretation of federalism was dual federalism.
Dual federalism is defined as “a system of government in which both the
states and national government rem ain supreme within their own
sphere, each responsible for some policies” (Edwards et al. 2005, 79).
This interpretation very m uch rests on the idea th a t “federalism ...m eans
legalism—the predominance of the judiciary in the Constitution” (Dicey
1902, 170-171). However, such language is nowhere m entioned in the
Constitution and other scholars argue th a t “the federal judiciary should
not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultim ate power of the
national government vis-à-vis the states; rather...[it] should be treated as
nonjusticiable, final resolution being relegated to the political branches—
i.e.. Congress and the President” (Choper 1980, 175).

14
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Thurloivv. Massachusetts; Fletcher V. Rhode Island;
Pierce v. New Hampshire
A clear sign of the Taney’s Court interpretation of federalism is evident
in the so-called License Cases (1847). These cases dealt with the ability
of local m erchants to tax alcohol im ports and whether or not such laws
violated the Commerce Clause. As previously mentioned, the Marshall
Court in its Gibbons decision again took an expansive and suprem e view
of federal power and the License Cases would directly contradict
Gibbons. In a 9-0 decision, “the Court was unanim ous in upholding the
states’ authority” (Hall 1992, 504). In his opinion, Taney stated “every
power delegated to the federal government m u st be coincidence with a
perfect right in the states to all th at they have not been delegated; in
coincidence, too, with the possessing of every power and right necessary
for their existence and preservation” (46 U.S. 504).

Civil W ar/Reconstruction Courts (1865-1895)
After a Union victory in the U.S. Civil War, the Court returned to the
Marshall interpretation of national supremacy.

Progressive Era Courts (1896-1936)
Dual federalism would be tweaked again at the tu rn of the 20^^
Century; however, this brand of dual federalism would be different from
the Taney Court’s. The Progressive Movement was in full force, however.

15
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the Court walked a fine line in its jurisprudence. Epstein and Walker
(2004) argued th a t for “the Courts from the 1890s through the 1930s,
dual federalism and the Tenth Amendment were m asks to hide their
laissez-faire philosophy.” However, this belief was questioned most
notably by Gillman (1993). Gillman suggested th at the Courts and
opinions of this era “represented a serious, principled effort to m aintain
one of the central distinctions in nineteenth century constitutional law—
the distinction between valid economic regulation...and invalid ‘class’
legislation on the other—during a time of unprecedented class conflict”
(Gillman 1993, 10).
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)
No case better displays the fine line the Progressive E ra courts walked
than Hammer V. Dagenhart. The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act was
passed by Congress in 1916 and “prohibited shipm ent in interstate
commerce of factory products made by children under the age of fourteen
or by children aged fourteen to sixteen who worked more th an eight
hours a day” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 342). Roland Dagenhart had
two sons, Reuben and John, who based on North Carolina law could
work up to 11 hours a day, which directly flew in the face of the new
child labor law. Backed by the mill where they were employed and
num erous big business advocates, the D agenharts contested.
The Court ruled 5-4 in favor of D agenhart citing a difference between
m anufacturing and commerce found in United States v. E. C. Knight

16
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(1895) and in doing so, they successfully “argued th at the production
and m anufacture of goods were not part of commerce and could not be
regulated by Congress” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 59). In the Court's
opinion. Chief Justice William Day stated
The act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the Constitution. It not
only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over
commerce, b u t also exerts a power as to a purely local m atter to
which Federal authority does not extend. The far-reaching result
of upholding the act cannot be more plainly indicated th an by
pointing out th at if Congress can th u s regulate m atters entrusted
to local authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in
interstate commerce, all freedom of commerce will be at an end,
and the power of the states over local m atters may be eliminated,
and th u s our system of government be practically destroyed (247
U.S. 251).
Thus, the act was struck down and the power was returned to the states.
Although it did indeed cham pion dual federalism, it differed from the
dual federalism of the Taney Court in th a t the decision w asn’t necessarily
advocating states’ rights. Instead, “the justices were bent on prohibiting
any state or federal interference with the growth of the nation’s booming
private-sector economy...at the sam e time, the Court limited the ability of
states to pass similar legislation because th a t would restrict individual
liberties” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 345). Thus, Hammer was more of a
self-serving decision th an one th a t truly embraced states’ rights.
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in his dissent of Hammer, “I should have
thought th at if we were to introduce our own moral conceptions where,
in my opinion, they do not belong, this was preeminently a case for
upholding the exercise of all its powers by the United States” (Hall 1992,

17
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360). It was a victory for big business; however, the onset of the Great
Depression in the 1930s would see the case overturned and the
emergence of a new federalism interpretation called cooperative
federalism.

Post-New Deal Courts (1937-1975)
The Great Depression affected all aspects of American life; however,
one of the last places th at would feel its effects was the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the Court remained dominated by the same justices who
presided over the Progressive Era courts. They were still steered by the
dual federalism th at was m ost evidently pronounced in Hammer.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was so u p set at the Court
overturning key New Deal legislation, such as the National Industrial
Recovery Act, th a t he proposed to expand the Supreme Court to include
upto 15 justices and as president would get to nom inate some six new
justices. The court-packing plan failed due to a combination of negative
public opinion and an increasing willingness of the Court “to uphold
Roosevelt's New Deal initiatives. Over the next few weeks, the Court
signed off on both the Social Security Act and the National Labor
Relations Act” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 62) without a change in Court
personnel. The next few years saw several resignations and deaths and
as such Roosevelt did get to appoint some five justices. This new Court
would return to the ideas of Jo h n M arshall’s national suprem acy and
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imprint a new federalism interpretation known as cooperative federalism.
Cooperative federalism is “a system of government in which powers and
policy assignm ents are shared between states and the national
government” (Edwards et al. 2005, 79).
United States v. Darby Lumber (1941)
The post-New Deal Court would not wait long to make its m ark on its
interpretation of federalism. 1938 saw the passing of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (also known as the Wages and Hours Law) th at
“established a minimum wage of 40 cents per hour and a maximum
workweek of 40 hours for businesses in interstate commerce” (Boyer
2003, 751). This piece of New Deal legislation blatantly contradicted the
Court's 1918 Hammer decision. Fred W. Darby was the owner of a
Georgia lum ber company th at violated the pay quota established in the
Fair Labor Standards Act and cited Hammer as his defense.
The Court, in a 9-0 decision, completely reversed itself from ju s t 23
years prior. Citing
The powerful and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes, the
conclusion is inescapable th a t Hammer v. Dagenhart was a
departure from the principles which have prevailed in the
interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the
decision and th at such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had h as
long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled (312
U.S. 100).
The decision “also gutted the Tenth Amendment [by] denying th a t the
am endm ent constituted a tool th a t litigants could wield to build up state
authority th a t they could then use to challenge the exercise of
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enum erated and implied powers by the federal government” (Epstein and
Walker 2004, 346). Yet, the decision was not a total victory for
cooperative federalism. It “failed to invoke the total power of Congress
over commerce. Rather, it w as m ade applicable to employees engaged In
commerce’ or ‘in the production of goods for commerce”’ (Hall 1992, 217).
This lack of clarity would see the issue emerge once again in National
League o f Cities v. Usery (1976) and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority (1985) with the Supreme Court having to decide
whether or not the act applied to all workers and federalism would be
redefined yet again.
Wickard v. Filbum (1942)
If Darby began the C ourt’s movement from dual federalism to
cooperative federalism, Wickard solidified it. In Wickard, the Court ruled
“th at Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity th a t is not itself
‘commercial,’ in th at it is not produced for sale, if it concludes th a t the
failure to regulate th at class of activity would undercut the regulation of
the interstate m arket in th a t commodity” (317 U.S. 111). Under such an
interpretation, commercial activity could be applied to nearly any
endeavor and th u s justiciable u n d er the Commerce Clause. However,
this was not an unbeknow nst byproduct, b u t a clear and rational
decision by the Court.
The author of the Court’s opinion in Wickard was Ju stice Robert
Jackson. In his personal correspondence, Jackson wrote of how the
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decision was symbolic of the Court crossing the Rubicon. “A frank
holding th at the interstate commerce power h as no lim its except those
which Congress sees fit to observe might serve a wholesome purpose. In
order to be unconstitutional by the judicial process if th is Act is
sustained, the relation between interstate commerce and the regulated
activity would have to be so absurd th a t it would be laughed out of
Congress” (Cushman 1998, 218). In sum, Jackson saw three key
reasons for altering dual federalism jurisprudence. Firstly, “he thought
that maintaining a pretense of review brought disrespect on the
judiciary... Second, he thought the prospect of judicial review forced
Congress to frame legislation th a t was unnecessarily complex and
indirect...[and lastly Jackson thought the Court ‘should not stand as a
symbol of a protection of states right when in fact is powers has
vanished”’ (Cushman 1998, 218). Moreover, Wickard was a 9-0 decision
so Jackson was clearly not alone in his thinking.

The Burger Court (1969-1986)
In term s of federalism interpretation, perhaps no Court is more
fascinating th an th a t presided over by W arren E. Burger. Burger was a
Richard Nixon appointee and “was chosen because of his judicial
experience, his opposition to Warren Court criminal procedure decisions,
his criticism of judicial activism, and because his career was free of
ethical blemishes” (Hall 1992, 104). What is so fascinating about the
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Burger Court and federalism is it begins adhering to cooperative
federalism, briefly attem pts to restore some limit to the exercise of federal
power back to cooperative federalism in a period of only nine years. This
is largely due to the changing make u p of the Court and a key reversal of
opinion.
National League o f Cities v. Usery (1976)
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and its constitutionality, which
was upheld in the aforementioned Darby Lumber, emerged once again
the mid-1970s. In 1974, Congress passed a “federal statu te th at
extended the maximum hours and minimum wage provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to most state and municipal employees” (Hall 1992,
573). A collective representing the cities called the National League of
Cities argued th at the statute violated the Tenth Amendment. “As one
litigant claimed, the Tenth Amendment should protect the powers states
already possessed, including authority over public workers” (Epstein and
Walker 2004, 347). Surprisingly, the decision would be a radical
departure from cooperative federalism and national supremacy
supported by the Burger Court years earlier.
“The Court reached its decision by distinguishing between ‘traditional’
and ‘nontraditional’ governmental functions” (Devins and Fisher 2004,
66). The 5-4 opinion along ideological lines, written by Justice William
Rehnquist stated.
We have reaffirmed today th a t the States as States stand on a
quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when
22
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challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate
commerce...Congress may not exercise that power so as to force
directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions
regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be
made. We agree th a t such assertions of power, if unchecked, would
indeed, as Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in [Maryland
V.] Wirtz, allow “the National Government [to] devour the essentials
of state sovereignty,” and would therefore transgress the bounds of
the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause (426
U.S. 833).
However, the Court did not define what constituted “traditional” and
“untraditional” and as such chaos and contradiction ensued in future
applications. The decision “did not stand alone. When seen in context
with decision such as Younger v. Harris (1971) and Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd. (1975) it seemed to signal judicial willingness to protect state
political and judicial processes” (Kobylka 1986, 26). Nevertheless, ju s t
nine years later the same Burger Court with a couple new justices would
reverse its attem pt to limit the excesses of federal power and embrace
cooperative federalism again.
Hunt V. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)
The North Carolina Board of Agriculture passed a regulation in 1972
“th at required all closed containers of apples shipped into the state to
display either the U.S. D epartm ent of Agriculture (USDA) grade or
nothing at all. It barred information based on the grading system s of the
states in which the apples were grown” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 476).
The state of W ashington developed its own grading system and as such,
placed it on all of its containers and as such, asked the state of North
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Carolina to make an exception, b u t they refused so the W ashington State
Apple Advertising Commission (WSAAC) sued citing violation of the Tenth
Amendment.
WSAAC argum ent stated “the law clearly discrim inated against
interstate commerce in favor of local growers...diminished the m arketing
advantage of [Washington] state’s industry had earned...[and] increased
the cost of interstate commerce” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 477). In the
court’s 8-0 decision (Justice Rehnquist did not participate) they ruled in
favor of WSAAC stating
When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found
is dem onstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in
term s of the local benefits flowing from the statu te and the
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to
preserve the local interests a t stake. North Carolina has failed to
sustain th a t burden on both scores (432 U.S. 333).
Thus, the Burger Court began to embrace cooperative federalism again.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)
“One of the curious features of the 1976 [National League o f Cities]
decision is th a t when the Supreme Court rem anded the case to a threejudge district court, instead of the district court’s determining the
difference between traditional and nontraditional functions, it said to the
Departm ent of Labor: You figure it out” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 67).
Among the items listed as nontraditional, and th u s having to abide by
the Federal Labor Standards Act, was th a t of local system s of m ass
transit.
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After falling into debt in the 1970s, the San Antonio T ransit System
(SATS), renam ed the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
(SAMTA) in 1978, “turned to the federal government for assistance. The
federal Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) provided it with a $4
million grant...Between 1970 and 1980, the transit system received more
than $51 million or 40 percent of its cost from the federal government”
(Epstein and Walker 2004, 353-354). Several employees filed suit
against SAMTA dem anding overtime pay and the case was brought before
the Supreme Court in 1984.
As previously mentioned. National League o f Cities, and later Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association (1981), attem pted to
develop tests for w hat constituted traditional functions. “Despite a
num ber of attem pts to clarify the m eaning of these tests, no clear lines
had been established by the time of Garcia” (Hall 1992, 325). Garcia
argued
There is nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirem ents
of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA, th a t is destructive of state
sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision. The States'
continued role in the federal system is primarily guaranteed not by
any externally imposed limits on the commerce power, b u t by the
structure of Üie Federal Government itself. In these cases, the
political process effectively protected th at role. (469 U.S. 528).
The lack of clarity since the 1976 decision saw Justice Harry Blackmun,
change his mind and overrule the decision. In the Court’s opinion,
Blackmun wrote, “we perceive nothing in the overtime and minimumwage requirem ents of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA th a t is destructive
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of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision” (469 U.S.
528). Blackmun added the Supreme Court has “no license to employ
freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when m easuring
congressional authority u n d er the Commerce Clause” (469 U.S. 528).
Thus, “the Court should, except in rare and ill-defined circum stances,
remain on the sidelines, trusting th at state interests will be protected by
the ‘political safeguards of federalism”’ (Pittenger 1992, 1).
Thus, unrestrained cooperative federalism and national suprem acy
emerged yet again; however, its victory would last only to 1995. Some
argued, “Garcia interjects a wholly fictitious clause into Article I. It is a
clause th at commits to Congress the power to decide how far the power
to regulate commerce should extend. It is a clause th a t is not there and
doubtless would have ever been adopted” (Van Alstyne 1985, 1727).
Garcia was only a 5-4 opinion and among the dissenters was William
Rehnquist, author of National League o f Cities. In his dissent, Rehnquist
wrote “do not think it incum bent on those of u s in dissent to spell out
further the fine points of a principle th a t will, I am confident, in time
again command the support of a majority of this Court” (469 U.S. 528).
He would not have to wait very long.
Thus, the history of federalism in American history underw ent
significant changes. From the beginning of the republic to the post-New
Deal Court era, dual federalism was the established federalism
jurisprudence. However, Darby and Wickard shattered all existing
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understanding of federalism instituting a new interpretation known as
cooperative federalism th at allowed the federal government the power to
regulate nearly any activity.
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CHAPTER 3

THE REHNQUIST COURT
The Rehnquist Court is notable for its interpretation of federalism.
It would reexamine the post-New Deal Courts cooperative federalism
jurisprudence and limit the excesses of federal power.
William Hubbs Rehnquist was born October 1, 1924 in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. After serving in World War II he entered Stanford University
earning a m aster's degree in 1949 in Political Science, the best discipline,
and another m aster’s degree in Political Science from Harvard University
in 1950. He followed those accomplishments with a Ju ris Doctorate, first
in class, from Stanford Law School in 1951. A mere two m onths later he
accepted a position from Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as a
law clerk, a position he would hold until 1953. “The experience of
working for Jackson confirmed Rehnquist’s conservative instincts”
(Tushnet 2005, 14).
As Justice Jackson’s clerk, he authored “a memorandum to help the
justice prepare for the Court’s discussion of the constitutional challenge
to officially segregated schools” (Hall 1992, 715). In the memo titled “A
Random Thought on the Segregation Cases,” Rehnquist wrote several
interesting and revealing statem ents. He argued to uphold the separate
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but equal doctrine established in Plessy stating the NAACP’s argum ent
“that a majority may not deprive a minority of its constitution right, the
answer m ust be made th at while this is sound in theory, in the long run
it is the majority who will determine w hat he constitutional rights of the
majority are” (Tushnet 2005, 19). He also wrote “it w as no p art of the
judicial function to thw art public opinion except in extreme cases”
(Tushnet 2005, 19). Thus, it is reasonable to assum e th a t racial
segregation was not extreme enough for his point of view. Such
statem ents suggest a lack of moral fiber, b u t also directly refute
necessary tenets of traditional democratic theory th a t the United States
was founded upon, th a t being protection of minority rights th a t were
clearly violated by segregation.
From 1953-1969 Rehnquist privately practiced law in Phoenix,
Arizona where Arizona Senator and 1964 Republican Presidential
candidate Barry Goldwater called him “the most conservative lawyer”
(Tushnet 2005, 13) he ever met. “From 1969 until 1971 Rehnquist
served as assistan t attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel. In
that position, he supported executive authority to order wiretapping and
surveillance without a court order, no-knock entry by the police (which
was recently declared constitutional in Hudson v. Michigan in Ju n e
2006), preventative detention and abolishing the exclusionary rule” (Hall
1992, 715). These positions could be regarded as violating of the Fourth
Amendment.
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1971 saw Ju stice Jo h n M arshall Harlan II announced his retirem ent
from the bench, so President Richard M. Nixon nom inated Rehnquist as
his replacem ent after m uch cajoling from Attorney General Jo h n Mitchell
and Counsel to the President Jo h n Dean, two key figures in the
upcoming Watergate scandal. During the confirmation hearings the
controversial memo written as a law clerk regarding w as unearthed and
Rehnquist claimed th at the memo addressed Jack so n ’s views on the
issue, not his, b u t was written by Rehnquist.
Most people who have studied the m atter believe th at it expresses
w hat Rehnquist, not Jackson, thought...R ehnquist later
acknowledged th at he couldn’t remember Jack so n ’s saying th a t he
had been “excoriated by liberal’ colleagues” for upholding Plessy,
and th at Rehnquist himself had defended Plessy—at least for
debating purposes—around the lunch table with other law clerks
(Tushnet 2005, 20).
Nevertheless, it did not have an effect on the hearings. Following a 68-26
vote in the Senate, Rehnquist was confirmed as an Associate Justice on
Jan u ary 7, 1972.
It would not take long to see R ehnquist’s views on federalism. In Roe,
Rehnquist was one of two dissenters. In his dissent, Rehnquist included
a history of anti-abortion statutes dating back to 1821 and concluded
There apparently was no question concerning the validity of this
provision or of any of the other state statutes when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted. The only conclusion possible from this
history is th a t the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth
Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with
respect to this m atter (410 U.S. 113).
Similarly, this belief in placing some lim itations on the excesses of
federal power was evident in National League o f Cities as Rehnquist
30
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authored the Court’s opinion partially reversing Darby Lumber. He
furthered indicated his position to limit the excesses of federal power in
Moose Lodge v. Irvis (1972), Columbus v. Penick (1979), Richmond
New spapersv. Virginia (1980), and Carterv. Kentucky (1981) and notably
dissented in Garcia (1985).
In 1986, Chief Justice W arren Burger announced his retirem ent from
the United States Supreme Court. “The Reagan adm inistration had no
problem figuring out who to appoint in his place. Rehnquist was an
‘intellectual giant’ to the conservative lawyers in the D epartm ent of
Justice and at the White House” (Tushnet 2005, 32). Following a 65-33
vote in the Senate, Rehnquist was confirmed as the sixteenth Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on September 26, 1986. Interestingly, “it
was the largest num ber of negative votes on a successful nom ination”
(Tushnet 2005, 32) up to th a t point in American history and only the
fourth time an Associate Justice was elevated to the Chief Justice
position.

New York y . United States (1992)
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 declared th at
each state “responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either
within or outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste
generated within its borders” (505 U.S. 144). This was due to the states
of Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina accepting a disproportionate
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am ount of radioactive waste due to having the only facilities to house
them. The law and its 1985 am endm ents placed certain conditions on
states th a t did not comply including graduated surcharges and finally
demanding “th at states come u p with a way to dispose of low-level
radioactive waste by 1996 or be forced to become the owners of it”
(Devins and Fisher 2004, 52). By 1990, the state of New York was far
behind in creating its own facilities and creating a regional pact and th u s
sued claiming the law violated the Tenth Amendment. After being
upheld at the state level, it was appealed to the Suprem e Court.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act. Writing the Court’s opinion. Ju stice S andra Day
O’Connor declared
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States.
State governments are neither regional offices nor adm inistrative
agencies of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by
state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most
detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead “leaves to
the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” reserved
explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment (505 U.S. 144).
Thus, states cannot be commanded by Congress, only provide incentives.
This anti-commandeering principle is the first key decision indicative of
the Rehnquist Court’s desire to create some limit to the excesses of
federal power th a t dominated the post-New Deal era.
A significant element of the decision was a dram atic change in the
Court’s make-up. New to the Court were Anthony Kennedy, Antonin
Scalia, David Souter and Clarence Thomas. All of these justices were
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nominees of conservative presidents and favored a judicial check on
Congress. Interestingly, Thomas’ confirmation “by a 52-48 margin [was]
the closest Supreme Court vote in more th an a centuiy” (Milkis and
Nelson 1999, 365). This m ake-up would continue issuing decisions th at
limited the excesses of federal power into the new millennium.

United States v. Lopez (1995)
In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zone Act citing the
Commerce Clause, b u t they did not provide evidence linking commerce to
gun possession on school grounds arguing th a t if Congress could
conclude there was a relationship, then th a t would be sufficient. Alfonso
Lopez J r . , a senior at a San Antonio high school, was arrested for
possessing a handgun on school property in March 1992 and sentenced
to six m onths in prison plus parole and fines. “Lopez argued th a t the
simple possession of a weapon on school grounds is not a commercial
activity th at reasonably falls under the Commerce Clause. Furtherm ore,
the regulation of crime and education are traditional areas of state, not
federal, jurisdiction” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 447). The federal court
of appeals ruled in favor of Lopez and th a t decision was appealed to the
Supreme Court in 1995.
In a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion striking
down the statu te declaring, “The Act neither regulates a commercial
activity nor contains a requirem ent th a t the possession be connected in
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any way to interstate commerce. We hold th a t the Act exceeds the
authority of Congress” (514 U.S. 549). Solicitor General of the United
States, Drew Days, argued for the federal government stating “th at
possessing guns near schools had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce because possessing guns n ear schools threatens the
educational climate, impairing the education children get and thereby
producing less well-educated and less productive graduates” (Tushnet
2005, 260).
Rehnquist responded stating “under the theories th a t the Government
presents...it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where the States
have historically have been sovereign” (514 U.S. 549). He concluded by
declaring.
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to
pile inference upon inference in a m anner th at would bid fair to
convert congressional authority u n d er the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly,
some of our prior cases have taken long steps down th a t road,
giving great deference to congressional action. The broad language
in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, b u t we decline here to proceed any further. To do so
would require u s to conclude th a t the Constitution's enum eration
of powers does not presuppose something not enum erated and
th a t there never will be a distinction between w hat is truly national
and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do (514 U.S. 549).
It was “the first time since 1936 th a t the Court had struck a federal law
on the basis of the Commerce Clause (Waltenberg and Swinford 1999,
102 ).
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The opinion did have four dissenters, three of whom filed opinions.
Justice Stephen Breyer argued “Congress...had a rational basis for
finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gun-related
school violence and interstate commerce...As long as one views the
commerce connection, not as a Technical legal conception,’ b u t as ‘a
practical one’” (514 U.S. 549) citing Swift & Co. v. United States (1905).
Furtherm ore, he saw a clear connection between school and commerce
as “education, although far more th a n a m atter of economics, has long
been inextricably intertwined with the Nation’s economy” (514 U.S. 549).
He concluded by noting three serious legal problems the decision created
th a t include running
Contrary to m odem Supreme Court cases that have upheld
congressional actions despite connections to interstate or foreign
commerce th at are less significant th an the effect of school
violence..., the Court believes the Constitution would distinguish
between two local activities, each of which has an identical effect
upon interstate commerce, if one, b u t no the other, is ‘commercial’
in nature..., [and] threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law
that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled” (514 U.S.
549).
Justice Jo h n Paul Stevens added in his dissenting opinion.
Guns are both articles of commerce and articles th at can be used
to restrain commerce. Their possession is the consequence, either
directly or indirectly, of commercial activity. In my judgm ent.
Congress' power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the
power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because of
their potentially harmful use; it necessarily follows th at Congress
may also prohibit their possession in particular m arkets (514 U.S.
549).
In the third dissenting opinion. Ju stice David Souter stated.
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The Court observes th at the Gun-Free School Zones Act operates
in two areas traditionally subject to legislation by the States,
education and enforcement of criminal law. The suggestion is
either th at a connection between commerce and these subjects is
remote, or th at the commerce power is simply weaker when it
touches subjects on which the States have historically been the
primary legislators. Neither suggestion is tenable (514 U.S. 549).
In his concurring opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas outright declared
“we ought to tem per our Commerce Clause jurisprudence” (514 U.S.
549). The decision m arked the return of w hat Douglas G insburg called
the Constitution in Exile. This is “m eant to identify legal doctrines th at
established firm limitations on state and federal power before the New
Deal...(and thus] encourage judges to strike down laws on behalf of
rights th a t don’t appear explicitly in the Constitution” (Rosen 2005).
Lopez was by no m eans a simple case of poor argum ents by the
government, b u t followed the example of New York and later Printz,
Alden, Morrison, etc. th a t there would be a restoration on the limitations
to the exercise of federal power. It was a key departure from the New
Deal, pre-Rehnquist Court interpretations th a t would continue with the
Court further placing limitations on the excesses of federal power.

Seminole Tribe ofFloridav. Florida (1996)
Amendment XI: The Judicial pow er o f the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one o f the United States by Citizens o f another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects o f any Foreign State.

36

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, “any Indian tribe
having jurisdiction over Indian lands...shall request the State in which
such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming
activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with
the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a com pact” (517 U.S. 44).
The Seminole Tribe cited Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989) where
“a divided Court ruled th at the Commerce Clause perm itted Congress to
make an exception to the Eleventh Amendment's grant of immunity,
holding th at the power to regulate commerce ‘among several S tates’
would be ‘incomplete without the authority to render States liable in
damages’” (Epstein and Walker 2004, 372).
In a 5-4 decision. Chief Ju stice Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinion
stating.
In the five years since it w as decided. Union Gas h as proven to be a
solitary departure from established law... In overruling Union Gas
today, we reconfirm th at the background principle of state
sovereign imm unity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not
so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an
area, like the regulation of Indian commerce th at is under the
exclusive control of the Federal Government. Even when the
Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over
a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.
Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida m u st be dismissed for
a lack of jurisdiction (517 U.S. 44).
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In his dissent, Justice Jo h n Paul Stevens noted “the im portance of the
majority's decision...cannot be overstated...It prevents Congress from
providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States,
from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning
bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national
economy” (517 U.S. 44).
In yet another dissent. Ju stice David Souter noted.
There is no possible argum ent th a t the Eleventh Amendment, by
its term s, deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over all citizen
lawsuits against the States. Not even the Court advances th a t
proposition, and there would be no textual basis for doing so.
Because the plaintiffs in today's case are citizens of the State th at
they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to
them (517 U.S. 44).
As it pertained to the right for a federal court to hear the case, Souter in
a lengthy discussion of history concluded “because neither text,
precedent, nor history supports the majority's abdication of our
responsibility to exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to u s in Article III, I
would reverse the judgm ent of the Court of Appeals” (517 U.S. 44).
However, some argued th at the decision was not widely applicable
since “Congress h as provided a remedy against the state b u t not against
state officials” (Monaghan 1996, 132). However, the application would be
expanded in Alden v. Maine (1999). D etractors of the decision argued it
violated Article III of the Constitution and “exemplified the Court’s
increasingly adam ant refusal to countenance the headlong expansion of
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Congress’ regulatory power u n d er the Constitution’s Commerce Clause”
(Waltenberg and Swinford 1999, 121).

Printz V. United States {1997)
The 1993 Brady H andgun Prevention Act “required the Attorney
General to establish a national in stan t background check system by
November 30, 1998” (521 U.S. 898). It was an addendum to the Gun
Control Act of 1968 th a t forbade the sale of guns to various criminals
and mentally unstable individuals. In states that did not have
background-checking systems, it m andated th at the local chief law
enforcement officer (CLEG) “conduct background checks on prospective
handgun purchases” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 71). Sheriff Ja y Printz of
Ravalli County, M ontana sued objecting “to being pressed into federal
service, and contend[ed] th at congressional action compelling state
officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.” (521 U.S. 898) as
decreed in New York.
In a 5-4 decision, Antonin Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion ruling in
favor of Printz and striking down the act stating, “it is incontestable that
the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’ Although the
States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government,
they retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,”’ (521 U.S. 898) as
discussed in Federalist No. 37. Citing New York, Scalia emphatically
added “the m andatory obligation imposed on CLEOs to perform
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background checks on prospective handgun purchases plainly ru n s
afoul” (521 U.S. 898) of the court’s 1992 ruling. Furtherm ore, Scalia
added.
Today we hold th a t Congress cannot circumvent th a t prohibition
by conscripting the S tate’s officers directly. The Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the S tates’ officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to adm inister or enforce a
federal regulatory program. It m atters not w hether policymaking is
involved, and no case by case weighing of the burdens or benefits
is necessary, such commands are fundamentally incompatible with
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty (521 U.S. 898).
Among the dissenters was Justice Jo h n Paul Stevens who cited the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Tenth Amendment as the basis for
the legality of the Brady Handgun Prevention Act.
The Tenth Amendment imposes no restriction on the exercise of
delegated powers...The Amendment confirms the principle th a t the
powers of the Federal Government are limited to those affirmatively
granted by the Constitution, b u t it does not purport to limit the
scope or the effectiveness of the exercise of powers th a t are
delegated to Congress. Thus, the Amendment provides no support
for a rule th a t immunizes local officials from obligations th a t might
be imposed on ordinary citizens (521 U.S. 898).
Justice David Souter cited The Federalist as the basis of his dissent.
Hamilton in No. 27 first notes th a t because the new Constitution
would authorize the National Government to bind individuals
directly through national law, it could “employ the ordinary
magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its laws.” Were he to
stop here, he would not necessarily be speaking of anything
beyond the possibility of cooperative arrangem ents by agreement.
But he then addresses the combined effect of the proposed
Supremacy Clause, and state officers' oath requirem ent, and he
states th a t “the Legislatures, Courts and M agistrates of the
respective members will be incorporated into the operations of the
national government, as far as its ju s t and constitutional authority
extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its
laws.” The natural reading of this language is not merely th a t the
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officers of the various branches of state governments may be
employed in the performance of national functions; Hamilton says
th a t the state governmental machinery “will be incorporated” into
the Nation's Operation, and because the “auxiliary” sta tu s of the
state officials will occur because they are “bound by the sanctity of
an oath,” I take him to m ean th at their auxiliary functions will be
the products of their obligations th u s undertaken to support
federal law, not of their own, or the States', unfettered choices (521
U.S. 898).
Furtherm ore, in No. 44 Madison wrote, “the members of the federal
government will have no agency in carrying the State constitutions into
effect. The members and officers of the State governments, on the
contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the Federal
Constitution” (Publius 1961, 284). Souter concluded “in light of all these
passages, I cannot persuade myself th a t the statem ents from No. 27
speak of anything less than the authority of the National Government,
when exercising an otherwise legitimate power (the commerce power,
say), to require ‘auxiliaries’ to take appropriate action” (521 U.S. 898).

A ldenv. Maine (1999)
A group of probation officers brought suit against the state of Maine
in 1992 for failure to pay overtime as dictated in the Federal Labor
Standards Act. While the suit was pending the Supreme Court ruled in
Seminole Tribe “even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment
prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
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unconsenting States” (517 U.S. 44). The probation officers’ suit was
dismissed and appealed to the Supreme Court in 1999.
“Alden presented the first opportunity for the Court to determ ine
whether Article I perm its Congress to abrogate a states’ imm unity in its
own courts” (Mezey 2000, 32). Writing for the Court’s opinion. Ju stice
Anthony Kennedy wrote
It is unquestioned th at the Federal Government retains its own
immunity from suit not only in state tribunals b u t recognizing the
essential sovereignty of the States, we are reluctant to conclude
th a t the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege...When
Congress legislates in m atters affecting the States, it may not treat
these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations.
Congress m u st accord States the esteem due to them as joint
participants in a federal system, one beginning with the premise of
sovereignty in both the central Government and the separate
States (527 U. S. 706).
Thus, the suit was dism issed and extended the Seminole ruling.
In his dissent. Ju stice David Souter wrote on the issue of federalism.
The State of Maine is not sovereign with respect to the national
objective of the FLSA. It is not the authority th a t prom ulgated the
FLSA, on which the right of action in this case depends. That
authority is the United States acting through the Congress, whose
legislative power under Article I of the Constitution to extend FLSA
coverage to state employees has already been decided, see Garcia
V. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985), and is not
contested here (527 U. S. 706).
As it pertains to the Fram ers’ intent, he wrote th at “the Court abandons
a principle...much closer to the h earts of the Framers: th a t where there
is a right, there m u st be a remedy” (527 U. S. 706). And th u s, citizens
have no remedy. Indeed, “Eleventh Amendment doctrine today creates
vast areas in which the states can operate without m uch concern about
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federal judicial enforcement of the constitutional or federal statutory
rights of individuals” (Doernberg 2002, 149). This is a potentially
dangerous predicament. In fact, the decision “may signify th a t imm unity
federalism is the Court’s new strategy of choice for preserving, or
reestablishing, some balance between state and nation” (Young 1999,
51). Again, the Court was limiting the excesses of federal power

United States v. Morrison (2000)
In 1994 Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
th at
Provided money for shelters for abused women eind for educational
programs about violence against women. It made it easier to
enforce orders restraining abusive men from approaching their
victims by making it a federal crime to cross state lines to harm a
person protected by a restraining order. VAWA also had a civil
remedy provision, allowing people—mostly women, of course—
attacked by others on the basis of their gender to sue the attackers
in federal court for dam ages (Tushnet 2005, 261).
That same year, Virginia Tech student Christy Brzonkala claimed fellow
students Antonio Morrison and Jam es Crawford raped her. “So
traumatizing was the episode, she related, th a t she dropped out of school
and attem pted suicide” (Leuchtenburg 2002, 91). After receiving w hat
she deemed unsatisfactory remedies from the university, she decided to
sue the two men and Virginia Tech citing the VAWA. The provision
dealing with a federal remedy was the particular issue at hand and the
inferior courts ruled against Brzonkala. She appealed to the Supreme
Court.
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Unlike in Lopez, “Congress had made extensive findings th at sexual
assaults on women seriously affected their participation in the n atio n’s
economy. Women didn’t take some jobs th a t would have been available
to them because they were afraid of being assaulted, and they didn’t
travel from one state to another because of their fears” (Tushnet 2005,
264). Moreover, “Congress am assed findings and compiled a record to
dem onstrate th at domestic violence and sexual assault cost the economy
$5 to $10 billion a year” (Devins and Fisher 2004, 72).
Writing the Court’s opinion, Chief Ju stice Rehnquist struck down the
civil remedy provision stating.
Gender motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity... As we stated in Lopez, “[S]imply
because Congress may conclude th a t a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so.” Rather, “[wjhether particular operations affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather
th an a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this
Court”... We accordingly reject the argum ent th a t Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
th a t conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The
Constitution requires a distinction between w hat is truly national
and w hat is truly local. In recognizing this fact we preserve one of
the few principles th at h as been consistent since the Clause was
adopted. The regulation and punishm ent of intrastate violence th at
is not directed at the instrum entalities, channels, or goods involved
in interstate commerce h as always been the province of the States
(529 U. S. 598).
Despite noting Congress’ economic findings, the majority dismissed
them.
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In a dissenting opinion, Ju stice David Souter argued against
Rehnquist’s claim regarding who decides w hat falls u n d er interstate
commerce stating
Congress has the power to legislate with regard to activity th at, in
the aggregate, h as a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The
fact of such a substantial effect is not an issue for the courts in the
first instance, b u t for the Congress, whose institutional capacity
for gathering evidence and taking testimony far exceeds ours. By
passing legislation. Congress indicates its conclusion, w hether
explicitly or not, th at facts support its exercise of the commerce
power. The business of the courts is to review the congressional
assessm ent, not for soundness but simply for the rationality of
concluding th a t a jurisdictional basis exists in fact... True, the
methodology of particular studies may be challenged, and some of
the figures arrived at may be disputed. But the sufficiency of the
evidence before Congress to provide a rational basis for the finding
cannot seriously be questioned (529 U. S. 598).
He further cited Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1997) th a t
stated “the Constitution gives to Congress the role of weighing conflicting
evidence in the legislative process” (520 U.S. 180) and finally th a t “the
Act would have passed m uster a t any time between Wickard in 1942 and
Lopez in 1995, a period in which the law enjoyed a stable understanding
that congressional power under the Commerce Clause, complemented by
the authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause extended to all activity
that, when aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce”
(529 U. S. 598).
Justice Stephen Breyer added in his separate dissenting opinion “the
Constitution itself refers only to Congress' power to ‘regulate
Commerce...among the several S tates,' and to m ake laws ‘necessary and
proper’ to implement th a t power. The language says nothing about
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either the local nature, or the economic nature, of an interstatecommerce-affecting cause” (529 U. S. 598). Additionally,
His m ost pointed observation was th a t under the C ourt’s theory,
you could have two activities, one economic and other
noneconomic, with precisely identical effects on the national
economy, and Congress would have the power to regulate the first
and not the second, a result Breyer thought entirely inconsistent
with the idea underlying the commerce clause (Tushnet 2005,
264).
Nevertheless, was the opinion th a t drastic of a shift? Not really. It
merely applied the rational-basis test established in Lopez and when
applied here, it failed to pass m uster for a majority of justices.

Conclusion
Some have questioned the dissenters of Rehnquist Court decisions
stating “by refusing to accept the majority's attem pt to breathe life into
the federalism doctrine, the dissenters—who include some of the ablest
minds on the Court—have m issed the opportunity to collaborate in
fashioning a meaningful, yet practical, dem arcation between the national
and the local” (Fried 2000, A29).
In sum.
First, the Court has systematically shifted the federalism balance
toward the states in its expansion of the doctrine of Younger v.
Harris through the 1970s and 1980s. Second, it h as greatly
increased the scope of state immunity to federal law and federal
suits, with both substantive (Alden v. Maine (1999)) and expanded
procedural components (Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)). Third,
the Court has narrowed congressional power u n d er the Commerce
Clause (United States v. Morrison (2000) and United States v. Lopez
(1995)). Fourth, it has limited congressional power under Section
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5 of the Fourteenth Amendment {Board of Trustees o f the University
o f Alabama v. Garrett (2001)). Fifth, it h as circumscribed
congressional power to require states to assist in implementing
federal programs (New Yorkv. United States (1992)) (Doemberg
2005, 129-130).
However, has the Rehnquist Court by placing limitations to the excesses
of federal power drastically altered cooperative federalism as evidenced in
Darby Lumber and Wickard? No. The core of those decisions still exists,
but the Court has placed some limitations to areas th a t had previously
gone unfettered. As the Rehnquist Court further proceeded into the 21®^
Century, it would further display th at the Court did still rely on the core
of cooperative federalism as evidenced in Nevada Department o f Human
Resources V. Hibbs (2003), Granholmw. Heald (2005), Gonzales v. Raich
(2005), Kelo v. City o f New London (2005), and Gonzales v. Oregon (2006).
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CHAPTER 4

NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. HIBBS (2003)
Amendment XIV, Section 1 : All persons bom or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens o f
the United States and o f the State wherein they reside. No State
shall m ake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities o f citizens o f the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person o f life, liberty, or property, without due process
o f law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection o f the laws.
Amendment XIV, Section 5: The Congress shall have pow er to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions o f this article.
In 1993, Congress passed the Family Medical Leave Act (hereafter
FMLA), which sought to “alleviate sexually discriminatory hiring
practices. The FMLA allowed for women and men to take three m onths
off from work for family care w ithout being fired” (Perla 2003). Moreover,
the law dictates the leave is unpaid and “employees in high-ranking or
sensitive positions are simple ineligible for FMLA leave: of particular
importance to the States, the FMLA expressly excludes from coverage
state elected officials, their staffs, and appointed policymakers” (538 U.S.
721). Furthermore, an employee w asn’t eligible until after a year or
1,250 hours of service.
William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada D epartm ent of H um an
Resources utilized the FMLA w hen his wife was involved in a serious
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automobile accident and required neck surgery. “In addition, Hibbs was
worried th a t his wife’s depression, which was caused by the pain
medication she was taking, required round-the-clock attention” (Perla
2003). He requested and received the maximum of 12 weeks of unpaid
leave. Hibbs did not return to work after his allotted leave and as such
was fired.
Hibbs filed suit in federal district court and lost due to the C ourt’s
belief th a t the suit violated the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.
He appealed and th a t decision was reversed with the Ninth Circuit Court
ruling “the FMLA should be treated differently because the FMLA is
aimed at remedying gender discrimination, which is subject to
heightened scrutiny” (Perla 2003). The case was then granted certiorari
by the Supreme Court. It was argued Ja n u a iy 15, 2003 and decided
May 27, 2003.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled in favor of Hibbs. Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion (concurring were O’Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer). In doing so, he took special care
to note th a t the decision was not a departure from the Court’s previous
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as evidenced in Seminole Tribe and
Board o f Trustees o f Univ. o f Alabama v. Garrett (2001), b u t rather an
example of how those decisions could be utilized to successfully
challenge the statute. “We have made clear th at the Constitution does
not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against non-consenting
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States. Congress may, however, abrogate such immunity in federal court
if it makes its intention to abrogate unm istakably clear in the language of
the statue and acts p u rsu an t to a valid exercise of its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” (538 U.S. 721). The FMLA
stated “an action to recover the dam ages or equitable relief prescribed in
paragraph 1 may be m aintained against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction” (29
U.S.C. §2617(a)(2)). Obviously, the government would classify as a
public agency and as such is applicable. As such, the FMLA relied on
Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as its source of power as
determined in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976). “In other words, Congress may
enact so-called prophylactic legislation th at proscribes facially
constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional
conduct” (538 U.S. 721).
City o f Boem e v. Flores (1997) established a test by which the Court
can determine if a statute is a valid exercise of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The test m ust show “congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the m eans adopted
to that end” (521 U.S. 507). Furtherm ore, the Court ruled in Craig
Boren (1976) “statutory classifications th at distinguish between males
and females are subject to heightened scrutiny” (538 U.S. 721) and th u s
not the rational-basis test. Indeed, “w hat separates Hibbs from its
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predecessors is the Court’s characterization of the constitutional right
protected and the nature of the discrimination” (W. Williams 2004, 327).
Rehnquist openly adm itted the Court’s chauvinistic history as it
pertained to gender discrimination. Some scholars claim “such honesty
suggests th a t the Court may have been predisposed to accepting
Congress’s evidence of statewide gender discrimination” (Williams 2004,
328). The evidence in question involved B ureau of Labor Statistics
surveys th at showed a widening gap (33 percent to 16 percent in one
year to 37 percent to 18 percent the next) of available leave between
females and males following childbirth. Other data showed “m any States
offered women extended ‘m aternity’ leave th a t far exceeded the typical 4to 8-week period of physical disability due to pregnancy and childbirth,
but very few States granted men a parallel benefit: Fifteen States
provided women u p to one year of extended m aternity leave, while only
four provided men with the sam e” (538 U.S. 721). The Court saw this as
a clear example of gender discrimination. Furtherm ore, when debating .
the merits of the FMLA, “Congress had evidence that, even where state
laws and policies were not facially discriminatory, they were applied in
discriminatory ways” (538 U.S. 721) often via individual discrimination of
those person in positions of power.
Rehnquist then detailed the states lackluster record in dealing with
gender discrimination. Admittedly, states began to address the issue
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before the federal government; nonetheless, their actions possessed
num erous shortcomings.
First, seven States had childcare leave provisions th at applied to
women only. Indeed, M assachusetts required th a t notice of its
leave provisions be posted only in "establishment[s] in which
females are employed." These laws reinforced the very stereotypes
th a t Congress sought to remedy through the FMLA. Second, 12
States provided their employees no family leave, beyond an initial
childbirth or adoption, to care for a seriously ill child or family
member. Third, many States provided no statutorily guaranteed
right to family leave, offering instead only voluntary or
discretionary leave programs. Three States left the am ount of leave
time primarily in employers' hands. Congress could reasonably
conclude th at such discretionary family-leave programs would do
little to combat the stereotypes about the roles of male and female
employees th a t Congress sought to eliminate. Finally, four States
provided leave only through administrative regulations or
personnel policies, which Congress could reasonably conclude
offered significantly less firm protection than a federal law. Against
the above backdrop of limited state leave policies, no m atter how
generous petitioner's own may have been. Congress was justified in
enacting the FMLA as remedial legislation. In sum , the States'
record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of,
gender-based discrimination in the adm inistration of leave benefits
is weighty enough to justify the enactm ent of prophylactic Section
5 legislation (538 U.S. 721).
Since gender discrimination falls within the realm of higher scrutiny and
not rational-basis review it differs from decisions in Kimel and Garrett.
“Because the standard for dem onstrating the constitutionality of a
gender-based classification is more difficult to meet th a n our rationalbasis test—it m ust ‘serv[e] im portant governmental objectives’ and be
‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives’” (538 U.S.
721). Furtherm ore, those cases dealt with extremely broad laws, while
“two characteristics of the FMLA distinguish it from the previous
antidiscrimination legislation. Firstly, Congress did not redefine the
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constitutional right which the FMLA sought to protect. Second, the
FMLA had a narrower scope, aimed solely at remedying the pattern of
gender discrimination in employers’ family-leave policies, th a n the
previous legislation” (W. Williams 2004, 330). For example, the Court
found in Boeme th a t the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s “sweeping
coverage ensured its intrusion at every level of government, displacing
law and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and
regardless of subject m atter” (521 U.S. 507). However, in Hibbs the
Court found th at the FMLA was “congruent and proportional to its
remedial object” (538 U.S. 721).
Among those penning brief concurring opinions were Ju stices Souter
and Stevens. Souter stated the decision was in line with his Section 5
jurisprudence dating back to his dissents in Seminole Tribe and Kimel.
Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence th at there is no doubt th a t the
Eleventh Amendment could not dism iss the case and cites the Commerce
Clause as the basis. “Accordingly, Nevada’s sovereign im m unity defense
is without merit” (538 U.S. 721).
Justice Kennedy wrote the prim ary dissent. The dissent targeted the
majority’s claim th a t the FMLA was a remedial program and instead
insisted it was an entitlem ent program, as well as, an overall lack of
evidence. “The evidence to substantiate this charge m u st be far more
specific, however, th an a simple recitation of a general history of
employment discrimination against women” (538 U.S. 721). Kennedy
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also pointed out num erous irregularities in the majority’s evidence such
as the statistics used are those which polled the private sector and th u s
not the state which would obviously fall in the public sector. Moreover,
certain laws discussed involved parenting leave, while the case at hand
dealt with caring for any family member. Regarding individual
discrimination Kennedy wrote, “even if there were evidence th at
individual state employers, in the absence of clear statutory guidelines,
discriminated in the adm inistration of leave benefits, this circum stance
alone would not support a finding of a state-sponsored pattern of
discrimination” (538 U.S. 721).
The dissent also picked apart the argum ent of the states not offering
equal family leave to their employees. It
Boils down to the fact th a t three States, M assachusetts, Kansas,
and Tennessee, provided parenting leave only to their female
employees, and had no program for granting their employees (male
or female) family leave. As already explained, th e evidence related
to the parenting leave is simply too attenuated to support a charge
of unconstitutional discrimination in the provision of family leave.
Nor, as the Court seems to acknowledge, does the Constitution
require States to provide their employees with any family leave at
all. A State's failure to devise a family leave program is not, then,
evidence of unconstitutional behavior (538 U.S. 721).
Interestingly, Kennedy stated th at those who felt discrim inated against
by the state could still sue utilizing the Commerce Clause. In
summation, Kennedy stated
What is at issue is only whether the States can be subjected,
without consent, to suits brought by private persons seeking to
collect moneys from the state treasury. Their im m unity cannot be
abrogated w ithout docum entation of a pattern of unconstitutional
acts by the States, and only then by a congruent and proportional
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remedy. There h as been a complete failure by respondents to ca n y
their burden to establish each of these necessary propositions (538
U.S. 721).
The majority’s use of evidence is particularly interesting because “n
Kimel, the Court limited its search for evidence before Congress to the
legislative history of the ADEA. Similarly, when searching for evidence
before Congress in the Garrett case, the Court looked only to the
legislative history of the ADA, and not to the general history of state
discrimination against the disabled” (MacConaill 2005, 853).
In a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia brandished the
majority for lumping the states together “as some sort of collective entity
which is guilty or innocent as a body” (538 U.S. 721) and instead m u st
examine “w hether the State h as itself engaged in discrimination
sufficient to support the exercise of Congress's prophylactic power” (538
U.S. 721).
Hibhs was a m onum ental decision because “although the C ourt’s
early decisions clarified w hat legislation would not satisfy the congruence
and proportionality test, it was not until Hibbs th a t we learned w hat
legislation would p ass the test” (W. Williams 2004, 318). This precedent
would be critical in future cases th a t attem pt to invoke Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, such as Tennessee v. Lane (2004) th at
successfully argued th a t disabled persons can sue the state if not
provided handicap-accessible government facilities. Some even
suggested “given the growing criticism of the congruence and
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proportionality test, it would not be unreasonable to speculate th a t the
Court sought a case th a t would validate its test by offering a m odem
example of congruent and proportional legislation” (W. Williams 2004,
336). Nevertheless, the majority of scholars viewed the act as a retreat
from its previous Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
laid out since Seminole Tribe.
Furtherm ore, the victory “was im portant more for doctrinal and
symbolic reasons th an for practical ones: if Mr. Hibbs had lost, the
practical result would have been limited to the 3.4 percent of the
workforce comprised of state employees. Yet Hibbs was of vital
importance, both for work/family advocates and for constitutional law”
(J. Williams 2004, 368).
The votes of Rehnquist and O’Connor surprised m any scholars
(Rehnquist more th an O’Connor). Rehnquist ensures to mention th at the
decision was not a departure from Seminole Tribe, et al. and th u s, not a
radical change. Some scholars argue his vote could be based on
personal history as he cared for “a terminally ill wife...and sometimes left
work early to help out his daughter (a single m other and a lawyer) had
child care problems” (J. Williams 2004, 374-375). Some have speculated
. that his traditional conservatism is partially to credit. As A ssistant
Attorney General, Rehnquist felt the Equal Rights Amendment was
dangerous and could lead to “nothing less th a n the sharp reduction in
importance of the family unit, with the eventual elimination of th a t unit
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by no means improbable” (Mayeri 2004, 814). Similarly, O'Connor's
personal history could be somewhat accountable for her vote. O’Connor
“has an established track record on family caregiving issues...S he cut
back to part-time work for seven years in order to raise her children” (J.
Williams 2004, 374).
The decision was a big victory for women’s groups who “hailed the
ruling not only for its explicit statem ent th a t Congress h as more leeway
to pass laws combating gender discrimination th an other forms of bias,
such as age and disability” (Mauro 2003). The decision was a clear
victory for civil rights advocates as well, b u t they nonetheless found error
in the judgment. Some find the C ourt’s “premise th a t there are some
types of discrimination th at really m atter, while others types of
discrimination do not m atter even enough to allow congressional action”
(Chemerinsky 2004, 99) u n ju st since it is not applicable to age and
disability.
Others found th a t the decision merely represented another example of
the Supreme Court unjustly overruling Congress like a patriarch would a
son or daughter. The Court “substituted its own judgm ent for th a t of
Congress in reviewing the weight of the congressional findings ab u t he
need for prophylactic legislation and the appropriate statutoiy remedy for
the asserted injury” (Bucholtz 2003-2004, 84). Such action is very m uch
indicative of the post-New Deal Courts. The “decision suggests;..the
existence of a line in the sand the Court is not willing to cross. This
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Court is ready to require more from a state challenging a congressional
attem pt to remedy discrimination th at implicates the core of the
Fourteenth Amendment” (MacConaill 2005, 855).
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CHAPTER 5

GRANHOLMv. HEALD (2005)
Amendment XXI, Section 2: The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession o f the United States fo r
delivery or use therein o f intoxicating liquors, in violation o f
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
The issue of liquor is one th a t is om nipresent in American
constitutional law. In fact, there are two of only twenty-seven
am endm ents devoted it. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited it, while
the Twenty-first Amendment repealed th at prohibition and added the
section above.
The growth of the Internet in the 1990s and 2000s saw an explosion
of wineries many of which are small and family-operated. In order to
reduce costs and be profitable, many of these wineries utilize direct
shipping of their liquors to consum ers. “Direct sales to consum ers
account for $350 million in annual sales from the more th an 3, 200
wineries in this countiy” (Greenhouse 2005). Each state possesses “a
three-tiered system: liquor producer to licensed wholesaler to licensed
retailer” (Stout 2005) for the distribution of liquor, th u s direct shipping
eliminates the wholesaler and retailer from the equation. Some 24 states
ban direct shipping from out-of-state wineries. Among those states are
Michigan and New York.
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Granholm is combination of cases brought by plaintiffs arguing
against both the Michigan and New York statutes. “Under Michigan law,
wine producers, as a general m atter, m u st distribute their wine through
wholeslaers. There is, however, an exception for Michigan’s
approximately 40 in-state wineries, which are eligible for V ine m aker’
licenses th at allow direct shipping to in-state consum ers” (544 U.S. 460).
Meanwhile, New York’s law is less obvious.
It channels m ost wine sales through the three-tier system, b u t it
too m akes exceptions for in-state wineries. As in Michigan, the
result is to allow local wineries to make direct sales to consum ers
in New York on term s not available to out-of-state wineries.
Wineries th a t produce wine only from New York grapes can apply
for a license th at allows direct shipm ent to in-state consum ers.
These licensees are authorized to deliver the wines of other
wineries as well, b u t only if the wine is made from grapes “at least
seventy-five percent the volume of which were grown in New York
state.” An out-of-state winery may ship directly to New York
consum ers only if it becomes a licensed New York winery, which
requires the establishm ent of “a branch factory, office or storeroom
within the state of New York” (544 U.S. 460).
The plaintiffs in both cases “claimed th a t the Michigem liquor Laws were
in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution because
they discriminated against interstate sales and delivery of wine, thereby
providing a direct economic advantage to in-state businesses and
interfering with the free flow of commerce (Gerwin and Saylor 2005).
However, these cases address the dorm ant Commerce Clause. That is
the “implicit limitation it places on state legislative power. In other
words, the negative implication of the Commerce Clause is th a t states
may not exercise similar power in an explicit area of federal
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congressional authrotiy. The dorm ant Commerce Clause th u s limits the
ability of states to regulate their own commerce in a way th a t could
impact interstate commerce” (Ballard 2006, 307).
In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled for the plaintiffs stating “the laws in
both States discrim inate against interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause and th a t the discrimination is neither authorized nor
permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment” (544 U.S. 460). Writing for
the majority (which included Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer),
Anthony Kennedy began citing Oregon Waste System s, Inc. v. Department
o f Environmental Quality o f Ore in which the Court determ ined th at
“differential tream tm ent of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and burdens the latter” (511 U.S. 93) is violative
of the Commerce Clause. He further stated.
The rule prohibiting state discrimination against interstate
commerce follows also from the principle th a t States should not be
compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or
disfavored statu s for their own citizens. States do not need, and
may not attem pt, to negotiate with other States regarding their
m utual economic interests. Rivalries among the States are th u s
kept to a minimum, and a proliferation of trade zones is prevented
(544 U.S. 460).
This principle is very similar to the anti-commandeering principle
established in New Yorkv. United States (1992).
In an exhaustive discussion of liquor law since the 1880s, Kennedy
notes two principles established by the Court prior to the 18*
Amendment. “First, the Court held th a t the Commerce Clause prevented
States from discriminating against imported liquor...Second, the Court
61

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

held th at the Commerce Clause prevented States from passing facially
neutral laws th a t placed an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce” (544 U.S. 460). In 1917, Congress passed and overrode
President William Howard Taft’s veto of the Webb-Kenyon Act which
stated.
That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids
transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for
use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in
such State of Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the
laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police
powers, to the same extent and in the same m anner as though
such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or
Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being
introduced therein in original packages or otherwise (544 U.S.
460).
However, Webb-Kenyon did not give states the right to discriminate.
Instead, Kennedy states “the Wilson Act reaffirmed, and the WebbKenyon Act did not displace, the Court's line of Commerce Clause cases
striking down state laws th at discrim inated against liquor produced out
of state. The rule of Tieman, Walling, and Scott remained in effect: States
were required to regulate domestic and imported liquor on equal term s”
(544 U.S. 460).
The Court then turned to the Twenty-first Amendment. The Court
found “the aim...was to allow States to m aintain an effective and uniform
system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation,
importation, and use. The Amendment did not give States the authority
to pass nonuniform laws in order to discrim inate against out-of-state
goods, a privilege they had not enjoyed a t any earlier time” (544 U.S.
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460). Following the Twenty-first Amendment’s ratification in December
1933 through 1940, the Court ruled in num erous cases th a t the
Amendment permitted discrimination such as State Bd. O f Equalization
o f Cal.

V.

Young’s Market Co. (1936). The majority found these decisions

to be “inconsistent with history.” Also note th a t such decisions were
before the post-New Deal Era and the introduction of Wickard.
The Court instead relied on recent cases dealing with the Section 2 of
the Twenty-first Amendment. “First, the Court has held th a t state laws
th at violate other provisions of the Constitution are not saved by the
Twenty-first Amendment...Second, the Court has held th a t Section 2
does not abrogate Congress' Commerce Clause powers with regard to
liquor” (544 U.S. 460). In fact, in Hostetterv. Idlewild Liquor Corp. (1964)
the Court ruled
To draw a conclusion from this line of decisions th a t the Twentyfirst Amendment h as somehow operated to “repeal” the Commerce
Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned
would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce
Clause had been pro tanto “repealed,” then Congress would be left
with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in
intoxicating liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre
and is dem onstrably incorrect (377 U.S. 324).
The Court then definitively ruled “the Court has held th a t state
regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of
Commerce Clause” (544 U.S. 460). This was m ost pronounced in
Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias (1984) when the Court ruled “the central
purpose of the Amendment was not to empower States to favor local
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liquor industry by erecting barriers to competition” (468 U.S. 263).
Thus, the three-tier system utilized in states is constitutional as long as
it is applicable to everyone, including in-state wineries.
Lastly, Michigan and New York argue there are “two prim ary
justifications for restricting direct shipm ents from out-of-state wineries:
keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors and facilitating tax collection”
(544 U.S. 460). Both the Court found to be weak stating th a t minors are
less likely to drink wine th a n other forms of alcohol and th a t a simple
adult signature requirem ent upon delivery would suffice. However, th a t
does pose an interesting question if the item of commerce were beer or
liquor th at are more likely to be consumed by minors. As for taxation, “if
licensing and self-reporting provide adequate safeguards for wine
distributed through the three-tier system, there is no reason to believe
they will not suffice for direct shipm ents” (544 U.S. 460). The majority of
the Court th u s concluded “if a State chooses to allow direct shipm ent of
wine, it m ust do so on evenhanded terms. Without dem onstrating the
need for discrimination. New York and Michigan have enacted
regulations th a t disadvantage out-of-state wine producers. Under our
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these regulations cannot stand” (544
U.S. 460). Thus, the C ourt’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause was
very m uch an expansive one as evident since Wickard.
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The dissenters in the case were Stevens, Thomas, O'Connor and
Rehnquist. Stevens penned a dissenting opinion emphasizing the
original intent and contemporary rulings of the period. He argued
Today m any Americans, particularly those members of the younger
generations who make policy decisions, regard alcohol as an
ordinary article of commerce, subject to substantially the same
m arket and legal controls as other consum er products. That was
definitely not the view of the generations th at made policy in 1919
when the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified or in 1933 when it
was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment... The views of judges
who lived through the debates th a t led to the ratification of those
Amendments are entitled to special deference. Foremost among
them was Justice Brandeis, whose understanding of a State's right
to discriminate in its regulation of out-of-state alcohol could not
have been clearer (544 U.S. 460).
He then regurgitated the 1933-1940 decisions th at held this view.
Nevertheless, he concluded by noting, “today's decision may represent
sound economic policy and may be consistent with the policy choices of
the contemporaries of Adam Smith who drafted our original Constitution”
(544 U.S. 460). Alcohol is obviously an item of commerce and any
reasonable reading of the Commerce Clause suggests th a t it is not
exceptional. Indeed, to make it exceptional would severely underm ine
the Commerce Clause’s legitimacy.
Justice Thomas wrote a far lengthier dissent questioning the
majority’s interpretation of history. He particularly emphasizes the
Webb-Kenyon Act “because th a t Act's language displaces any negative
Commerce Clause barrier to state regulation of liquor sales to in-state
consum ers” (544 U.S. 460). He further argues th a t Michigan and New
York laws
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are within the Webb-Kenyon Act's term s and therefore do not ru n
afoul of the negative Commerce Clause. Those laws restrict out-ofstate wineries from shipping and selling wine directly to Michigan
and New York consum ers. Any winery th a t ships wine directly to a
Michigan or New York consum er in violation of those state-law
restrictions is a “person interested therein” “intend[ing]” to “s[ell]”
wine “in violation of’ Michigan and New York law, and th u s comes
within the term s of the Webb-Kenyon Act (544 U.S. 460).
Furtherm ore, he argued Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co.,
(1917) established th a t Webb-Kenyon’s “purpose was to prevent the
immunity characteristic of interstate commerce from being used to
permit the receipt of liquor through such commerce in States contrary to
their laws” (242 U.S. 311). Based on this history of the Webb-Kenyon
Act alone, Thomas concludes th a t Michigan and New York are allowed to
discriminate. Nevertheless, he entertains the Twenty-first Amendment,
Section 2 argument.
Again, Thomas argued th at when viewed through th a t lens, the
discrimination laws are constitutional.
Though the Twenty-first Amendment m irrors the basic terminology
of the Webb-Kenyon Act, its language is broader, authorizing
States to regulate all “transportation or importation” th a t ru n s
afoul of state law. The broader language even more naturally
encompasses discriminatory state laws. Its term s suggest, for
example, th at a State may ban imports entirely while leaving in 
state liquor unregulated, for they do not condition th e State's
ability to prohibit im ports on the m anner in which state law treats
domestic products (544 U.S. 460).
He also reinforced Ju stice Stevens’ assertion of contemporary
interpretations that upheld discriminatory laws should be given
deference. Interestingly,
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though the dissents reached an outcome somewhat similar to
those in early cases, their conceptual approach is as different from
the C ourt’s approach in those cases as is the majority’s in
Granholm. The Court in the 1930s refused to consider the history
of Section Two, and without considering th at history, it is
impossible to arrive at either the Granholm majority’s or d issents’
positions, which all require Section Two to m ean something other
th an w hat the text suggests (Nielson 2006, 753).
It should also be mentioned th a t Thom as’ strict constructionist ideology
would assum edly cause his dissent since the majority relies on the
implicit.
Perhaps his m ost damaging argum ent is in regard to the Court’s
usage of Bacchus. “This is odd, because the Court does not even
mention, let alone apply, the ‘core concerns’ test th a t Bacchus
established. The Court instead sub silentio casts aside th a t test,
employing otherwise-applicable negative Commerce Clause scrutiny and
giving no weight to the Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon
Act” (544 U.S. 460). The Court should have “considered the legitimacy of
the local interest asserted by the states [by] weighing them against the
federal interest” (Williams 2006, 634). Thus, the Court utilized its
expansive Wickard interpretation of the Commerce Clause. He concluded
“the Court does this Nation no service by ignoring the textual commands
of the Constitution and Acts of Congress. The Twenty-first Amendment
and the Webb-Kenyon Act displaced the negative Commerce Clause as
applied to regulation of liquor imports into a State. They require
sustaining the constitutionality of Michigan's and New York's direct-
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shipment laws” (544 U.S. 460). In sum , “his dissent reflected the belief
th a t the majority insisted on making policy decisions th a t were
ultimately better left to the states” (Ballard 2006, 317).
The Court’s decision is very m uch an extension of its Commerce
Clause jurisprudence since Wickard. Indeed, the Court placed em phasis
on the post-New Deal Court’s interpretation of the Twenty-first
Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act and outright stated th at the
1933-1940 decisions were false. Furtherm ore, the Court relied on
implicit language th at is not found in the Constitution furthering its
ability to regulate anything and everything th a t falls within the realm of
commerce. Critics of the dorm ant Commerce Clause cited “the
inconsistent application and use of imprecise criteria when [the Court]
does apply the doctrine...Some com m entators have based their
criticisms...on the source of the Court opinions, calling for the Privileges
and Immunities Clause to serve the function th at the dorm ant Commerce
Clause now performs” (Ballard 2006, 319).
“It is plain th at those who favor free m arkets have reason to celebrate
the Court’s holding, which obliterated laws th a t appear to be motivated
be rent seeking” (Nielson 2006, 750). There is no doubt the laws were
discriminatory and furtherm ore “no m em ber of the Court...fails to
recognize the legitimacy of the antidiscrim ination principle, although
Justice Thomas ahs written it is not found in the dorm ant Commerce
Clause b u t instead in the Import-Export Clause” (Nielson 2006, 752).
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The potential damage of course involves the three-tier system utilized
in the states. The ruling has the potential to damage wholesalers and
retailers by simply bypassing them . Indeed, “while the three-tier system
is constitutionally permissible, it is not constitutionally m andated”
(Rutledge and Daniels 2006, 55). However, it is unlikely th a t m any wine
consumers will make their purchases online in the immediate future.
However, as the Internet continues to grow it could become more
hazardous. “Hours after the ruling the head of Michigan’s Liquor Control
Commission, Nida Samona, said at a telephone news conference th at she
would urge the state’s Legislature to prohibit all direct sales”
(Greenhouse 2005).
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CHAPTER 6

GONZALES V. RAICH (2005)
The year 2005 saw a clear indication th at the Rehnquist Court was
not undergoing a federalism revolution. Tackling the issue of medical
m arijuana, the opinion was a clear reinforcement of the C ourt’s belief in
cooperative federalism.
In 1970, “Congress set out to enact legislation th a t would consolidate
various drug laws on the books into a comprehensive statute, provide
meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent
diversion into illegal channels, and strengthen law enforcement tools
against the traffic in illicit drugs” (000 U.S. 03-1454). The result was the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. In the
act. Congress divided various narcotics into different levels called
schedules. M arijuana was, and is still today, categorized as a Schedule I
drug “because of [a] high potential for abuse, lack of any accepted
medical use, and absence of any accepted safety for use in medically
supervised treatm ent” (000 U.S. 03-1454). Interestingly, “as a young
lawyer in the Nixon White House, Rehnquist helped to write the
Controlled Substances Act” (Gardner 2004).
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Angel Raich is a California resident who suffered from an inoperable
cancerous brain tumor. “She h as tried 35 approved medications for
relief of seizures and constant pain. None of them has worked, but
m arijuana h as been a godsend” (Kilpatrick 2004, 1 IB). She was able to
use m arijuana for treatm ent since California passed the Compassionate
Use Act of 1996.
The proposition was designed to ensure th at “seriously ill”
residents of the State have access to m arijuana for medical
purposes, and to encourage Federal and State governments to take
steps toward ensuring the safe and affordable distribution of the
drug to patients in need. The Act creates an exemption from
criminal prosecution for physicians, as well as for patients and
primary caregivers who possess or cultivate m arijuana for
medicinal purposes with the recommendation or approval of a
physician (000 U.S. 03-1454).
Raich was unable to cultivate the m arijuana herself, so she had two
friends, also nam ed in the suit as Jo h n Does, do so. Another plaintiff in
the case is Diane Monson who suffers from “chronic back pain and
spasm s” (Leef 2005). She cultivated the m arijuana herself. In sum , “11
states [have] legalized the use of m arijuana for patients u n d er a doctor’s
care” (Mears 2005).
“On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs and agents from the
federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) came to Monson’s
home...[and] after a 3-hour standoff, the federal agents seized and
destroyed all six of her cannabis plants” (000 U.S. 03-1454). This
caused the plaintiffs to file suit in October 2002 “charg[ing] th a t Attorney
General Jo h n Ashcroft and the DEA adm inistrator, Karen Tandy, had
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violated the[ir] constitutional rights” (Leef 2005). The plaintiffs cited the
Tenth Amendment, Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and doctrine of medical necessity in particular.
When the case reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, they ruled in
favor of Raich. They “concluded use of medical m arijuana was n on
commercial, and therefore not subject to congressional oversight of
‘economic enterprise’” (Meeirs 2005). Indeed, the Court’s decision would
be an interesting one. “It gave the conservatives a choice: uphold the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling favoring individuals engaged in the wholly
intrastate nan-economic activity of growing and consuming cannabis for
medical purposes as recommended by a doctor and perm itted by state
law or retreat from the landm ark Commerce Clause decisions” (Barnett
2005) in Lopez and Morrison.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held against Raich “ruling th at the federal
government can still ban possession of [marijuana] in states th a t have
eliminated sanctions for its use in treating symptoms of illness” (Lane
2005, AOl). However, it did not strike down the state laws. Writing for
the majority (which included Ju stices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
interestingly Kennedy and Scalia), Justice Jo h n Paul Stevens noted th at
the “respondents’ challenge is actually quite limited; they argue th a t the
CSA’s categorical prohibition of the m anufacture and possession of
m arijuana as applied to the intrastate m anufacture and possession of
m arijuana for medical purposes p u rsu an t to California law exceeds
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Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause” (000 U.S. 03-1454).
Some critics decried that “from a practical standpoint, any possibility of
using the Commerce Clause to regulate non-commercial activity appears
doomed” (Kramer 2001, 143) after Morrison, however, Raich shows th a t
to be false. The opinion rested largely on three previous court cases,
Wickardv. Filbum (1942), Lopez, and Morrison.
As previously mentioned, in Wickard, the Court ruled “th a t Congress
can regulate purely intrastate activity th a t is not itself ‘commercial,’ in
th at it is not produced for sale, if it concludes th at the failure to regulate
th at class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate
market in th at commodity” (317 U.S. 111). The plaintiffs detailed three
areas th at their case differed from Wickard, however, Stevens wrote
“those differences, though factually accurate, do not diminish the
precedential force of this Court’s reasoning” (000 U.S. 03-1454).
Furthermore,
In assessing the scope of Congress' authority u n d er the Commerce
Clause, we stress th at the task before u s is a m odest one. We need
not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, b u t only
w hether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. Given the
enforcement difficulties th a t attend distinguishing between
m arijuana cultivated locally and m arijuana grown elsewhere, and
concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty
concluding th a t Congress had a rational basis for believing th at
failure to regulate the intrastate m anufacture an d possession of
m arijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in
Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the
interstate m arket in a fungible commodity. Congress was acting
well within its authority to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce ... among the several
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States.” That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate
activity is of no moment. As we have done many tim es before, we
refuse to excise individual com ponents of th at larger scheme. (000
U.S. 03-1454).
It is the larger scheme issue th a t would again invoke Lopez and Morrison.
“Here, respondents ask u s to excise individual applications of a
concededly valid statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and
Morrison, the parties asserted th at a particular statute or provision fell
outside Congress' commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is
pivotal,” Justice Stevens added. The key distinction is not only th a t the
CSA was p art of a comprehensive action, th u s the act itself would have to
be accused, b u t also th at it dealt with issues th at are “quintessentially
economic...Because the CSA is a statu te th a t directly regulates
economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on
its constitutionality” (000 U.S. 03-1454). Furtherm ore, the plaintiffs did
not question Congress’ power to p ass the act.
Among the concurring justices were Anthony Kennedy and Antonin
Scalia—two conservative federal power limitation supporters. Some
question Kennedy’s vote since he did not file a concurring opinion.
However, some have suggested “Kennedy, it h as been clear for some
time, h as little tolerance, judicial or otherwise, for those who are u sers of
drugs, or who resist drug control m easures” (Dennison 2005). He
silently voted in favor of anti-drug positions in U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis
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Buyers' Cooperative (2001) and Board o f Education o f Independent School
District No. 92 o f Pottawatomie County v. Earls (2002).
As for Scalia, he filed a concurring opinion outlining his stance. The
key for him was the Necessary and Proper Clause. He noted.
Activities th at substantially affect interstate commerce are not
themselves part of interstate commerce, and th u s the power to
regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause
alone...[And] the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for
the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws
governing intrastate activities th a t substantially affect interstate
commerce. Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate
commerce effective. Congress may regulate even those intrastate
activities th a t do not themselves substantially affect interstate
commerce (000 U.S. 03-1454).
Thus, since cultivation of m arijuana by Californians possessed an effect
on interstate commerce, the Necessary and Proper Clause allows
Congress to regulate the activity. Now, on the surface it appeared to be a
retreat from his previous jurisprudence, however, it is actually merely a
tempering. He continued,
Lopez and Morrison affirm th a t Congress may not regulate certain
“purely local” activity within the States based solely on the
attenuated effect th a t such activity may have in the interstate
market. But those decisions do not declare noneconomic intrastate
activities to be categorically beyond the reach of the Federal
Government. Neither case involved the power of Congress to exert
control over intrastate activities in connection with a more
comprehensive scheme of regulation; Lopez expressly disclaimed
th at it was such a case and Morrison did not even discuss the
possibility th at it was. To dism iss this distinction as “superficial
and formalistic,” is to m isunderstand the nature of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to enact laws in
effectuation of its enum erated powers th at are not within its
authority to enact in isolation” (000 U.S. 03-1454).
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The key then is the presence of “a more comprehensive scheme of
regulation” (000 U.S. 03-1454). This particular case possessed it, while
the others did not. He was not reversing himself, b u t merely noting th at
in a particular instance, when a comprehensive scheme is present, the
Necessary and Proper Clause can be extended to intrastate activity. This
is a cooperative federalism notion.
Furthermore, he noted, “neither respondents nor the dissenters
suggest any violation of state sovereignty of the sort th a t would render
this regulation ‘inappropriate,’—except to argue that the CSA regulates
an area typically left to state regulation. That is not enough to render
federal regulation an inappropriate m eans” (000 U.S. 03-1454).
However, he left wide open the potential of arguing the case with the
Tenth Amendment as the focus.
Justice O’Connor based her opinion on the Tenth Amendment,
particularly noting the sta te’s police power. “This case exemplifies the
role of States as laboratories. The States' core police powers have always
included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens” (000 U.S. 03-1454). Thus, Congress
does not have the authority to regulate such m atters. She further
argued th a t the lack of findings and statistics harm the case.
Even assum ing th a t economic activity is at issue in this case, the
Government has made no showing in fact th a t the possession and
use of homegrown m arijuana for medical purposes, in California or
elsewhere, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce...There
is simply no evidence th a t homegrown medicinal m arijuana u sers
constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough class to have a
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discernable, let alone substantial, impact on the national illicit
drug m arket—or otherwise to threaten the CSA regime. Explicit
evidence is helpful when substantial effect is not “visible to the
naked eye” (000 U.S. 03-1454).
That is an interesting argument; however, to O’Connor the case did not
pass her rational-basis review test. Finally, she rested her argum ent on
Lopez, which stated “w hether particular operations affect interstate
commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather th an a legislative
question” (514 U.S. 549). However, “if one really believes in the
laboratories concept, one should w ant to free the states to conduct their
policy experiments, not to empower judges to decide which experiments
are the good ones and which are the bad” (Althouse 2005, 788).
In the case, the Court reaffirmed its cooperative federalist beliefs
noting th a t there are areas th at fall well within the bounds of federal
power. They employed the rational-basis test established in Lopez and in
this instance it passed. The Court ruled in favor of Congress regulating
an intrastate noneconomic activity by citing its exhaustive precedents,
most notably th a t of the post-New Deal era’s Wickard decision. However,
it is not a w atershed case m arking the death of Lopez and Morrison. “All
a future Court need to do to reconcile Raich with Lopez is to stress th at
[the] congressional findings satisfy the heightened rationality review
implicit in Iqpez” (Barnett 2005, 747). Moreover, “Raich did not overrule
Lopez and Morrison. The anti-commandeering principle rem ains...It is
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also possible th a t in a case presenting a less politically charged topic
than medical m arijuana, the Court will return to its project of policing at
least an outer limit to the powers of Congress” (Reynolds and Denning
2005, 933).
Lastly, the true legacy of the Raich decision may be the revelation of a
clear distinction between members of the conservative faction. Firstly,
“one of the lessons relate to Ju stices Kennedy and O’Connor. Although
they have provided the crucial fourth and fifth votes, they (especially
Justice Kennedy) have also been decidedly more nationalist th an m any
observers have realized” (Claeys 2005, 792). Indeed, Kennedy voted with
the liberal bloc in both Kelo and Oregon, and O’Connor would in Oregon
as well. Nevertheless, as will be dem onstrated, those cases do not
challenge Lopez and Morrison and actually exacerbate them.
Furtherm ore, the staunch conservatives Thomas and Scalia differed.
Thomas represents the views of “originalists,” who seek above all
else to identify and follow the original meaning of the relevant
constitutional text. Scalia represents the views of “judicial
m inim alists,” who seek above all else to develop rules that
minimize the interpretive and policymaking discretion of federal
judges. Although originalism and minimalism complement one
another in many cases, they do not always do so and Raich m arks
the New Federalism case where these two approaches diverged
(Claeys 2005, 791).
This is quite interesting. However, the tru e key is how conservative are
new appointees Jo h n Roberts and Samuel Alito? “Further, Raich
continued the Supreme Court’s uninterrupted practice of rejecting as-
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applied challenges to federal statutes, and is likely to preclude any such
suits in the future” (Adler 2005, 751).
Despite losing the decision, Angel Raich has begun litigation again on
the issue. This time she has “narrow[ed] the m atter to the right to life
theory: th at m arijuana should be allowed if it is the only viable option to
keep a patient alive or free of excruciating pain” (Kravets 2006, 9A). Her
case was argued in March 2006 in front of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals th a t ruled in her favor in 2003. As of publication time, the case
had not been decided. Nevertheless, “even if it is successful, the case
would be unlikely to stop the federal raids on pot clubs or protect m ost
users and suppliers” (Kravets 2006, 9A). Moreover, it is not a case
dealing with federalism. However, this author believes if the case
reaches the Supreme Court, Raich will again be ruled against since there
is no unequivocal test to determine th a t m arijuana is the only drug th at
alleviates suffering.
Those who argue th a t the Rehnquist Court dism antled the 1937
Constitutional Revolution need to look no further th an the Raich
decision. It was firm in supporting its precedent in Wickard and applied
its rational-basis review to determ ine the outcome, which of course is
conservative.
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CHAPTER 7

KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON (2005)
Amendment V: No person shall be held to answ er fo r a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentm ent or indictment o f
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time o f War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject fo r the same ojfence to be twice p u t
in jeopardy o f life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a w itness against himself, nor be deprived o f life, liberty,
or property, without due process o f law; nor shall private

property be taken fo r public use, without ju st compensation.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was applied to state
action via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (property) in
Chicago, Burlington 8&Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago (1897). In the
opinion. Justice Jo h n Marshall Harlan wrote “the conclusion of the court
on this question is th at, since the adoption of the fourteenth am endm ent,
compensation for private property taken for public u ses constitutes an
essential element in due process of law,' and th at w ithout such
compensation the appropriation of private property to public uses, no
m atter u n d er w hat form of procedure it is taken, would violate the
provisions of the federal constitution” (166 U.S. 226). In Ja n u a iy 2000,
the City of New London, Connecticut approved of a plan to “seize 15
properties from private owners and transfer the real estate to private
developers for later hotel, office and conference center projects” (Hamey
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2005, FOI) citing the power of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment th a t states “nor shall private property be taken for public
use, w ithout ju s t com pensation.” This Takings Clause, also known as
power of em inent domain, was the key issue in the case. Moreover, the
entity th a t was to develop the property w as a private one.
The City of New London (hereafter C ity’) argued th a t
Decades of economic decline led a state agency in 1990 to
designate the City a “distressed municipality.” In 1996, the
Federal Government closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center,
which had been located in the Fort Trumbull area of the City and
had employed over 1,500 people. In 1998, the City’s
unemployment rate was nearly double that of the State, and its
population of ju s t under 24,000 residents was at its lowest since
1920 (000 U.S. 04-108).
Collectively, this showed the City to be in a clear state of decline.
Nevertheless, Pfizer, the pharm aceutical giant, was building a new $270
million facility in City and as such, the City wanted to implement a
comprehensive economic revitalization program to the surrounding area.
The City asked the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a
private entity, to create such a plan. The NLDC’s plan targeted 90 acres
of land th at included “115 privately owned properties, as well as 32 acres
of land formerly occupied by the naval facility,” (000 U.S. 04-108) 18 of
which constituted Trumbull State Park. In sum, the plan was “projected
to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other
revenues...and to make the City more attractive and to create leisure and
recreational opportunities on the waterfront and in the park” (000 U.S.
04-108).
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After purchasing most of the property, there was a select group who
refused to sell under any circum stances. “Susette Kelo and six other
families...filed suit arguing their property rights were being violated by
well-connected developers” (Mears 2005). They cited the aforementioned
Takings Clause, particularly the “public u se” portion. Indeed, in the past
“government’s authority to condemn land for public use traditionally has
been used to eliminate slum s, or build highways, schools, and other
public works” (Mears 2005), however, the homes of Kelo, et al. were by
no means blighted nor was there a clear public use in the proposed
revitalization. The Connecticut State Supreme Court ruled in favor of
City and in February 2005 the case was argued before the Suprem e
Court and decided th at June.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the City’s right of
eminent domain. Justice Jo h n Paul Stevens, who was joined by
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, wrote the majority opinion. The
basis of the ruling rested on two previous Court decisions, Berman v.
Parker (1954) and Hawaii Housing Authority v. M idkiff {1984).
The key phrase under consideration was “public u se.” Stevens
argued.
While many state courts in the m id-19th century endorsed “use by
the public” as the proper definition of public use, th a t narrow view
steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the public" test
difficult to adm inister {e.g., w hat proportion of the public need
have access to the property? at w hat price?), b u t it proved to be
impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society.
Accordingly, when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment
to the States at the close of the 19th century, it em braced the
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broader and more natural interpretation of public use as “public
purpose.” See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
(1896)...[and] Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., (1906)
(000 U.S. 04-108).
Thus, it is this interpretation of “public purpose” not “public u se,” based
on over one hundred years of precedent th at m ust be taken into
consideration. The issue then becomes what is “public purpose” and
Stevens added, “without exception, our cases have defined th at concept
broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgm ents in this field” (000 U.S. 04-108).
In Berman, the Court ruled in favor of the city of Washington, D.C.
and its development plan of a blighted neighborhood. Berman claimed
th at his store was not blighted, b u t the Court stated, “The area m u st be
planned as a whole. It was not enough, they believed, to remove existing
buildings th a t were unsanitary or unsightly...The entire area needed
redesigning so th at a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for
the region, including not only new homes but also schools, churches,
pairks, streets, and shopping centers” (348 U.S. 26). Moreover, deference
to the legislature is again reinforced, “It is within the power of the
legislature to determine th at the community should be beautiful as well
as healthy...If those who govern the District of Columbia decide th a t the
Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing
in the Fifth Amendment th a t stands in the way” (348 U.S. 26).
Indeed, in the case of Kelo, the legislative body of the City of New
London deemed it appropriate to reinvigorate the area and indicative of
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the Berman decision, clearly possesses th a t right. Secondly, it is the
duty of legislative bodies to define public purpose, which City did.
Thirdly, the plaintiffs’ domiciles cannot be excluded as exceptions as it
could underm ine the entire project and create festering problems for the
future good.
Nevertheless, a key aspect of Kelo’s argum ent was th a t economic
development does not constitute “public u se.” Stevens added “putting
aside the unpersuasive suggestion th at the City's plan will provide only
purely economic benefits, neither precedent nor logic supports
petitioners' proposal. Promoting economic development is a traditional
and long accepted function of government...Quite simply, the
government's pu rsu it of a public purpose will often benefit individual
private parties” (000 U.S. 04-108). That conclusion was reached in
Berman as well when th a t opinion stated, “the public end may be as well
or better served through an agency of private enterprise th an through a
departm ent of government—or so the Congress might conclude. We
cannot say th at public ownership is the sole method of promoting the
public purposes of community redevelopment projects” (348 U.S. 26).
Lastly, the Court struck down the notion of giving Person B, Person A’s
land for simple economic gain because this case dealt with a
comprehensive plan and not a simple exchange.
Kelo further argued th a t there should be a “‘reasonable certainty’ th a t
the expected public benefits will actually accrue” (000 U.S. 04-108),
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However, in M idkiffthe Court stated, “when the legislature's purpose is
legitimate and its m eans are not irrational, our cases m ake clear th at
empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less th a n debates over
the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be
carried out in the federal courts” (467 U.S. 229). Again, it’s a legislative
power.
The key swing vote in the decision was th a t of Anthony Kennedy, a
conservative justice who broke from the ranks in this particular case. He
filed a concurring opinion. The key to him was the rational-basis review
under the Public Use Clause th a t indicates whether takings “intended to
favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits” (000 U.S. 04-108) and if so, m ust be struck down.
The trial court concluded, based on these findings, th a t benefiting
Pfizer was not “the prim ary motivation or effect of this development
plan”; instead, “the prim ary motivation for [respondents] was to
take advantage of Pfizer's presence.” Likewise, the trial court
concluded th a t “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate t h a t ...
[respondents] were motivated by a desire to aid [other] particular
private entities.” Even the dissenting justices on the Connecticut
Supreme Court agreed th a t respondents' development plan was
intended to revitalize the local economy, not to serve the interests
of Pfizer, Corcoran Jennison [developer], or any other private party.
This case, then, survives the meaningful rational basis review th at
in my view is required u n d er the Public Use Clause (000 U.S. 04108)
Thus, even though his opinion sided with City, it was a cautious
concurrence “signal[ing] th at governments seeking to u se em inent
domain powers to try to revitalize cities m u st show in the public benefits
of such projects” (Biskupic and Koch 2005). That test being the rational
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basis review. Moreover, “a more stringent standard of review might be
appropriate according to Justice Kennedy” (Nicholson and Mota 2005,
98).
Among the dissenters. Ju stice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote an
opinion. She cited the social contract and Colder v. Bull (1798) in which
the Court ruled
An act of the Legislature (for 1 cannot call it a law) contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a
rightful exercise of legislative authority...A few instances will
suffice to explain w hat 1 mean...[A] law th at takes property from A.
and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to
en tru st a Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be
presum ed th a t they have done it (000 U.S. 04-108).
She further argued “were the political branches the sole arbiters of the
public-private distinction, the Public Use Clause would am ount to little
more th an hortatory fluff. An external, judicial check on how the public
use requirem ent is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this
constraint oil government power is to have any meaning” (000 U.S. 04108). However, the key to her dissent is the decision “severely
underm ines the concept of checks and balances in this im portant area of
constitutional law” (Kanner 2006, 338). Thus, again her primary qualm
was th at the Court should be the final say on such issues.
So, how does this case represent a reaffirmation of cooperative
federalism or indicate a limitation on the excesses of federal power?
On one hand the decision clearly possessed an expansive view of
governmental powers and rested its laurels on precedents {Berman and
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Midkifj] established during the post-New Deal Court era. Moreover, it
utilized a wide interpretation of the Constitution beyond its mere
construction as indicative of “public u se” becoming “public purpose.”
Furthermore, the decision stated th a t it is the domain of the legislature,
not the judiciary to determine the various intents, th u s deferring to
them, which is clearly differentiated in the Constitution and a hallm ark
of federalism.
Interestingly, “two m onths after the ruling, addressing a bar
association meeting. Justice Stevens called [the decision] ‘unw ise’ and
said he would have opposed it had he been a legislator and not a federal
judge bound by precedent” (Broder 2006, Al). Thus, it is precedent th at
guided the decision.
However, the victory very m uch belongs to the states. In the final
paragraph of the majority opinion Stevens added “we emphasize th at
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power” (000 U.S. 04-108).
Indeed,
The reaction from the states was swift and heated. Within weeks of
the court's decision, Texas, Alabama and Delaware passed bills by
overwhelming bipartisan m argins limiting the right of local
governments to seize property and tu rn it over to private
developers. Since then, lawm akers in three dozen other states have
proposed similar restrictions and more are on the way, according
to experts who track the issue (Broder 2006, Al).
Kelo empowers states to act on the issue and not defer to the federal
government for its decisions.
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O’Connor argued “states play many important functions in o u r system
of dual sovereignty, b u t compensating for our refusal to enforce properly
the Federal Constitution (and a provision to curtail state action, no less)
is not among them ” (000 U.S. 04-108).
Some have argued “the real way to stop the abuse of em inent domain
is not to forbid its use for economic development, b u t to m ake sure th at
the funds so designated could have been used by the locality for other
purposes th a t likely would have had broader public support and
benefits” (Fischer 2006, 32). For example, if local citizens could have
better roads, more schools, etc. would they prefer the money be spent
there? If not, it should not be done. “The process of a city and its
citizens arguing about alternative uses of the money and ending u p using
it to buy a site to promote economic development would make it more
convincingly a ‘public u se ’” (Fischel 2006, 35). However, the Court
struck down such test proposals in Fallbrook Irrigation D ist v. Bradley,
(1896) and Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. (1906) for their
impracticality.
“Lawmakers in 47 states have introduced more th a n 325 m easures to
protect private property” (Mehren 2006, lA). Indeed, m any have
“expressed concern th at state officials, in their zeal to protect
homeowners and small businesses, would handcuff local governments
that are trying to revitalize dying cities and fill in blighted areas with
projects th at produce tax revenue and jo b s” (Broder 2006, Al). Some
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jurists have even proposed a constitutional am endm ent (Cohen 2006,
566-577) to ban economic development takings. Ironically, such an
action would be the m ost extreme instance of federal empowerment.
Only time will tell.
As for the revitalized New London waterfront, as of November 2005,
nothing had been accomplished. “Wary of public disapproval...the state
and the city have halted plans to evict the remaining residents. Investors
are concerned about building on land th a t some people consider a
symbol of property rights. At the same time, contract disputes and
financial uncertainty have delayed construction even in areas th a t have
been cleared” (Yardley 2005, Al). Moreover,
In September [2005], Gov. M. Jodi Rell of Connecticut dem anded
th a t the New London Development Corporation...rescind eviction
orders delivered to tenants in rental u n its th a t belong to
homeowners who have refused to give up their property. The
Connecticut General Assembly has asked cities to delay using
em inent domain while it considers revising state law (Yardley 2005,
A22).
The states are autonom ous in their own sphere and able to decide
whether or not they should allow takings in the nam e of economic
revitalization and the Court came to its opinion by merely reiterating
previous cooperative federalism decisions.
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CHAPTER 8

GONZALES V. OREGON {2006)
On November 9, 2001, Attorney General of the United States Jo h n
Ashcroft issued the following Interpretive Rule:
Assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” within the
meaning of 21 CFR 1306.04 (2001), and th at prescribing,
dispensing, or adm inistering federally controlled substances to
assist suicide violates the Controlled Substances Act. Such
conduct by a physician registered to dispense controlled
substances may “render his registration . . . inconsistent with the
public interest” and therefore subject to possible suspension or
revocation u n d er 21 U. S. C. 824(a)(4). The Attorney General's
conclusion applies regardless of w hether state law authorizes or
perm its such conduct by practitioners or others and regardless of
the condition of the person whose suicide is assisted (000 U.S. 04623).
This Interpretive Rule, sometimes referred to as the ‘Ashcroft Directive,’
was in direct response to the state of Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act.
“The 1994 law gives Oregon doctors the authority to prescribe controlled
substances to mentally competent, terminally ill patients who are within
six m onths of dying” (Lucas 2005). Furtherm ore, a second doctor m ust
then examine the patient and agree with the decision and “once the law’s
safeguards have been met, attending doctors may prescribe, b u t not
themselves adm inister, a fatal drug” (Kilpatrick 2006). In fact, “Oregon
voters have twice approved the law, in 1994 and also in 1997” (Lucas
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2005). It is unknown how m any total patients have utilized the act, but
37 patients did so in 2004.
Ashcroft interpreted “the Controlled Substances Act and announc[ed]
th at assisted suicide is not a legitim ate medical purpose' th a t would
allow doctors to prescribe Schedule II drugs under the act. Oregon,
joined by physicians and terminally ill patients challenged the rule”
(Mauro 2006). Since the Attorney General is the nation’s leading law
enforcement officer, Ashcroft surm ised this gave him the power to
threaten physicians who prescribe Schedule II drugs th a t if they do so for
the purpose of assisted suicide “their registration to distribute controlled
substances...[could be] revoked or be criminally prosecuted for violating
federal law” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006).
The case reached the 9 ^ Circuit Court of Appeals in May 2004, where
it ruled in favor of Oregon. “The majority found the directive unlawful
and unenforceable because it violated the plain language of the CSA,
undermined Congress’ intent and overstepped the bounds of the Attorney
General’s authority” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006). The Government
appealed the decision and the case was argued before the U.S. Supreme
Court on October 5, 2005.
On Jan u ary 17, 2006, the Court ruled 6-3 in favor of Oregon. The
majority opinion, authored by Ju stice Anthony Kennedy (joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter and O’Connor), dealt with the primary
issue of “the Interpretive Rule’s validity under the CSA...The parties
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before u s are in sharp disagreement both as to the degree of deference we
m ust accord the Interpretive Rule’s substantive conclusion and w hether
the Rule is authorized by the statutory text at all” (000 U.S. 04-623).
As it pertains to deference, there are two precedential cases the Court
considered, A uerv. Robbins (1997) and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council (1984). Oregon differed from Auer in the
respect th a t the “underlying regulation does little more th an restate the
term s of the statute itself. The language th e Interpretive Rule addresses
comes from Congress, not the Attorney General, and the neeirequivalence of the statute and regulation belies the Government's
argum ent for Auer deference” (000 U.S. 04-623).
Now,
If a statute is ambiguous, judicial review of administrative
rulemaking often dem ands Chevron deference; and the rule is
judged accordingly. All would agree, we should think, th at the
statutory phrase “legitimate medical purpose” is a generality,
susceptible to more precise definition and open to varying
constructions, and th u s am biguous in the relevant sense. Chevron
deference, however, is not accorded merely because the statu te is
am biguous and an adm inistrative official is involved. To begin
with, the rule m ust be promulgated p u rsu an t to authority
Congress h as delegated to the official. The Attorney General has
rulemaking power to fulfill his duties under the CSA. The specific
respects in which he is authorized to make rules, however, instruct
u s th a t he is not authorized to m ake a rule declaring illegitimate a
medical standard for care and treatm ent of patients th at is
specifically authorized under state law. (000 U.S. 04-623).
Make no m istake about it; the CSA very m uch limits the power of the
Attorney General. “Congress did not delegate to the Attorney General
authority to carry out or effect all provisions of the CSA. Rather, he can
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promulgate rules relating only to ‘registration’ and ‘control,’ and ‘for the
efficient execution of his functions’under the statu te” (000 U.S. 04-623).
It is within the realm of “registration” provision and its role in promoting
“public interest” th a t the Attorney General stated it could revoke
physicians’ licenses. “In determining consistency with the public
interest, the Attorney General m ust...consider five factors, including: the
State's recommendation; compliance with state, federal, and local laws
regarding controlled substances; and public health and safety.”
However, Ashcroft failed to consider these factors and goes a step further
declaring, “th at using controlled substances for physician-assisted
suicide is a crime, an authority th at goes well beyond the Attorney
General's statutory power to register or deregister.”
Furthermore, under the CSA, “the statu te perm its the Attorney
General to add, remove, or reschedule substances. He may do so,
however, only after making particular findings, and on scientific and
medical m atters he is required to accept the findings of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (Secretary). These proceedings m u st be on
the record after an opportunity for com m ent” (000 U.S. 04-623). Before
issuing the Interpretive Rule, Ashcroft made no contact with Secretary
and instead only relied on “the recommendation of the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Departm ent of Ju stice” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006).
Indeed, it is very possible th a t Ashcroft hastily issued the directive as “he
opposed physician-assisted suicide as a senator” (Mauro 2006) for years.
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Indeed, “CSA allocates decision-making powers among statu to ry actors
so th at medical judgm ents, if they are to be decided at the federal level
and for the limited objects of the statute, are placed in the h an d s of the
Secretary...The structure of the CSA, then, conveys unw illingness to cede
medical judgm ents to an Executive official who lacks medical expertise”
(000 U.S. 04-623). Ashcroft possessed little medical expertise.
Moreover, when the CSA extended its regulatory power to anabolic
steroids in 1990 “it relied not on Executive ingenuity, b u t ra th e r on
specific legislation” (000 U.S. 04-623). From a legal perspective, the
Interpretive Rule specifically notes th a t physician-assisted suicide h as no
“legitimate medical purpose” and such implies “medical jud g m en ts” on
which Ashcroft did not base his Rule on. “This confirms th a t the
authority claimed by the Attorney General is both beyond h is expertise
and incongruous with the statutory purposes and design” (000 U.S. 04623).
The CSA’s “statutory purposes [are] to combat drug ab u se and
prevent illicit drug trafficking” (000 U.S. 04-623). Again, physicianassisted suicide does not involve either criterion. Solicitor General Paul
Clement argued, “doctor-assisted suicide has a tendency to ‘debilitate
lives’ju s t as m uch as drug abuse, which is what The CSA primarily
targeted” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006). However, Ju stices O’Connor and
Souter noted th at such reasoning would include “lethal injection death
penalties” (Bloustein and Sachs 2006) into the CSA. Ju stice Breyer

94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

commented on the intent of the CSA asserting, “Congress didn’t think
about the death penalty, and it didn’t think of assisted suicide” (Alderson
Reporting Company, 2006, 8 ). Thus, “the statute and our case law
amply support the conclusion th at Congress regulates medical practice
insofar as it b ars doctors from using their prescription-writing powers as
a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally
understood. Beyond this, however, the statute m anifests no intent to
regulate the practice of medicine generally” (000 U.S. 04-623). In Raich,
the Court was dealing with m arijuana, which “has been determ ined by
Congress to have no legitimate uses, while the controlled substances
used in assisted suicide do have proper medical u ses” (Smith 2005).
There was a clear connection between m arijuana and potential abuse
and trafficking th a t was not present here.
Moreover, “regulation of health and safety is ‘primarily, and
historically, a m atter of local concern”’ (000 U.S. 04-623). It is an area of
federalism th a t historically was delegated to the states. During the oral
argum ents. Justice Souter specifically stated “th at Congress intended to
retain and respect the historic powers of the States to define legitimate
medical practices” (Alderson Reporting Company 2006, 56). The people
of the state of Oregon chose to enact the law and th u s, it is totally within
their power. Although Ju stice O’Connor did not file a concurring
opinion, it is possible to assum e her stance is very m uch an extension of
her dissent in Raich. “[Raich] exemplifies the role of States as
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laboratories. The States' core police powers have always included
authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens” (000 U.S. 03-1454). Oregon is th u s a laboratory
for the issue of assisted suicide.
Kennedy also noted th a t the CSA explicitly includes a role for states.
Not only does the Attorney General have to pay heed to the state's
recommendation and compliance with state and local laws regarding
controlled substances, b u t the CSA includes a pre-emption provision
which states.
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the p art of the Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates . . . to the exclusion of any State law on the
same subject m atter which would otherwise be within the
authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between
th a t provision . . . and th at State law so th at the two cannot
consistently stand together (000 U.S. 04-623).
Thus, including states is veiy m uch evident in the process and was
disregarded by Ashcroft. In sum, “the text and structure of the CSA
show th a t Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to alter the
federal-state balance and the congressional role in m aintaining it” (000
U.S. 04-623).
Justices Scalia and Thomas filed dissenting opinions. Scafia argued,
“the most reasonable interpretation of the regulation and of the statute
would produce the same result. Virtually every relevant source of
authoritative meaning confirms th at the phrase legitim ate medical
purpose’ does not include intentionally assisting suicide” (000 U.S. 04-
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623). He rested his argum ent on the fact th at medicine is to produce
health, while death obviously does not. He further stated,
Prohibition or deterrence of assisted suicide is certainly not among
the enum erated powers conferred on the United States by the
Constitution, and it is within the realm of public morality (bonos
mores) traditionally addressed by the so-called police power of the
States. But then, neither is prohibiting the recreational u se of
drugs or discouraging drug addiction among the enum erated
powers. From an early time in our national history, the Federal
Government has used its enum erated powers, such as its power to
regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting public
morality...Unless we are to repudiate a long and well-established
principle of our jurisprudence, using the federal commerce power
to prevent assisted suicide is unquestionably permissible (000 U.S.
04-623).
Such reasoning is in direct correlation with his concurring opinion in
Raich where a comprehensive scheme w as present, as it was here, since
it is the same act, the CSA, and as such, the federal government can
interfere in intrastate activity.
Justice Thomas made no argum ent supporting his dissent, b u t rather
he scolded the majority for “rest[ing] upon constitutional principles th at
[they] rejected in Raich” (000 U.S. 04-623). Nevertheless, by saying the
principle in Raich should be extended, he is doing the same thing and
reversing his own opinion. In fact, “Thomas justified his vote based on a
technicality: during oral argum ent, the lawyer for Oregon said he w asn’t
asking the Court to overturn its Commerce Clause precedents and,
Thomas says, he took the lawyer at his word” (Moller 2006). Thomas
concluded, “the scope of the CSA and the Attorney General's power
thereunder are sweeping, and perhaps troubling, such expansive federal
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legislation and broad grants of authority to adm inistrative agencies are
merely the inevitable and inexorable consequence of th is Court's
Commerce Clause and separation-of-powers jurisprudence” (000 U.S. 04623). Thus, Thomas is advocating cooperative federalism.
Gonzales v. Oregon represents another instance of the Rehnquist
Court limiting the excesses of federal power. However, w hat was most
interesting is th at the victory was courtesy of the liberal bloc of justices.
The Court upheld a sta te’s right to operate outside the realm of federal
legislation, th u s making it autonom ous in its own sphere. Moreover, it
restricted an expansive view of federal powers and instead cited the
state’s traditional power to regulate medical practice. Perhaps m ost
amazing is, “neither side even mentioned the Constitution’s
Amendment” (Kilpatrick 2006, IIB). Certainly, the issue of assisted
suicide is nowhere enum erated in the Constitution and as such by the
power of the Tenth Amendment m ust be a power reserved to the states.
Based on th at criterion alone, Oregon should have won. Nevertheless, no
one bothered to m ention this obvious oversight. Again, in Oregon, the
liberal justices were guided by precedent in examining the Interpretive
Rule, but also by Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) where they “ultimately
upheld a state ban on assisted suicide, [but] it left the issue to the
states” (Lucas 2005).
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Thus, the Rehnquist Court again applied its rational-basis review and
established th at this area of federal expansion was too far-reaching and
thu s curbed its excess.
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CHAPTER 7

THE STATE OF FEDERALISM
The issue of federalism is one of param ount importance in American
history. The federalism debate is as old the nation itself. From the end
of the Revolutionary War to 1787, the country was mired in depression
and inefficiency due to the government established under the Articles of
Confederation. That government relied upon states’ rights and was
foundering. Then we reevaluated the federalist system. At w hat became
known as the Constitutional Convention, the Framers created a
centralized government. Yes, the states would retain some power,
however, through such clear enum erations as the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Supremacy Clause, the federal government’s
preeminence reigns supreme.
The Supreme Court h as constantly varied on its interpretation on
such issues as the Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh
Amendment, Supremacy Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Thus, they are key players in the federalism debate. The M arshall Court
(1801-1835) operated under national supremacy, which does recognize
states possess power, however, when conflict arises, the national
government reigns supreme. The Taney Court (1835-1864) would alter
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this understanding and instead follow the dual federalism interpretation
holding th a t the states and federal government remain autonom ous in
their own spheres. This lack of recognizing federal suprem acy was the
central issue th a t led to the American Civil War th at divided the nation in
two and cost 620,000 lives.
From 1865-1895 the Reconstruction Courts returned to national
supremacy, b u t then the Court balanced itself representing “the
judiciary’s attachm ent to traditional limits of legislative power” (Gillman
1993, 15). These limits would last until 1937 when the post-New Deal
Court would institute cooperative federalism as its interpretation of
federalism and give the federal government exhaustive power. Although
it would hit a few speed bum ps in the 1970s and 1980s, it remained
largely intact throughout the century and into the new millennium.
On the surface, Lopez appeared to transform the interpretation of
federalism, however, it merely represents the point in which the Court
stopped allowing the federal government free reign. These limitations as
explored in the rational-basis review would further limit the excesses of
federal power as it pertained to the Commerce Clause in Morrison and
Oregon; and extended to the Fifth Amendment in Kelo\ Tenth
Amendment in New York and Printz; the Eleventh Amendment in
Seminole Tribe and Alden; and Fourteenth Amendment in Garrett. The
Raich and Granholm decisions showed th at the Court h as no difficulty
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adhering to cooperative federalist principles th at were established in the
post-New Deal era.
Indeed, “the classic dilemma about federalism [is] we might like to
empower vanguard states to experiment with bold, creative new policies,
but we also fear the bad things states might do if they have autonomy”
(Althouse 2005, 788). As for the justices themselves, we are left with a
pretty clear picture. Ju stices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer are
clear and constant proponents of coopérative federalism, b u t recognize
there are certain issues th a t are state issues as evidenced in Oregon.
The conservative bloc of Roberts, Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy likewise
believe in cooperative federalism, b u t are more apt to limit its excesses.
Indeed, none of the recent cases explored repudiate the core of Wickard.
As of Jan u ary 31, 2006, Sandra Day O'Connor was replaced with Samuel
Alito. His swing vote could determine the future of federalism for years
to come.
In May 2006, the Court had the potential to further define its
federalism interpretation in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno. However, the Court
sidestepped the question of interpreting the Commerce Clause and
instead dismissed the case on the grounds th a t the plaintiffs did not
have standing to sue. Nevertheless, its Commerce Clause interpretation
will emerge again in the combined cases of Rapanos v. United States and
Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps o f Engineers th a t were argued before the
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Court on February 21, 2006. However, one thing rem ains likely is th at
the debate will continue to rage on until the end of this union.
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